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The conflict in Syria has left the country in ruins physically, socially and economically 
since 2011. The estimates for rebuilding the physical damage vary from 250 billion 
USD to 400 billion USD (Daher 2019), and it is inevitable that the reconstruction will 
need international effort. However, as the conflict context evolves, who can and is 
willing to reconstruct after years of conflict, humanitarian crisis and refuge? This thesis 
studies the European Union’s approach towards the reconstruction of Syria and the 
dilemmas that it faces in building its stance. 
The European Union’s official stance has been since adopting the EU Strategy on Syria 
in 2017, that it will participate in the reconstruction of Syria only when a political 
process, based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and the 
Geneva Communiqué (2012) is firmly underway. Thus it sets very tight conditionalities 
to the reconstruction assistance by linking it to the political process in Geneva under 
UN auspices. The message is firm:  
“--- what is clear is that the European money will come for reconstruction 
only once a political agreement is reached in Geneva under UN auspices 
and with the right guarantees of credibility.” (EEAS 2017a.) 
However, it is clear that the political agreement is not in near sight, as the political 
process has been more or less stalled since 2017. Regardless of that, the European 
Union has kept on repeating its stance until 2019. This thesis will analyse the stance in-
depth: how does the EU define reconstruction, and what are the conditionalities for the 
participation? What kind of political agreement is needed? What kind of Syria does the 
EU agree to reconstruct? 
Exploration of these questions happens in a complex conflict context, which poses 
challenges for peacebuilders and reconstructors. The context challenges presumptions 
about a “post” conflict state, where some agreement or victory has been achieved and 
approved and legitimised by external actors so that the reconstruction as a whole state 
can begin with the support of international community. Often the reconstruction 
approaches are focusing on rebuilding the state institutions, which in the case of Syria 




legitimate the Assad government and strengthen its grip on the state institutions, making 
transition and democratic aspirations nigh impossible. This research can give insights 
on how external actors’ visions for post-conflict state and their approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction can clash with the realities of conflict. In addition to the conflict realities, 
the actors need to tackle both domestic and foreign policy challenges, which affect their 
approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction and can cause contradictions or dilemmas 
between their objectives, principles and interests. How do actors navigate within these 
kinds of dilemmas?  
To deepen the understanding of these dynamics, the main research question in this 
thesis is: What is the European Union’s approach towards the reconstruction of Syria? 
The question is answered through analysis of what principles and features does the EU 
promote in the reconstruction of Syria, and how does it present itself in the conflict 
context. Reconstruction is framed under the EU’s approach to peacebuilding. The 
analysis is based on publicly available documents from relevant EU bodies, such as the 
External Action Service (EEAS) and the remarks from the High Representative 
Federica Mogherini. Thus this thesis studies how the EU’s approach is presented in 
these sources as linked to the image that the EU presents of itself as an actor in the 
conflict. The thesis does not aim to explain the EU actions in the conflict so far but to 
focus on the reconstruction discussion and how the EU presents itself and its policy in 
it. After analysing the EU’s approach to the reconstruction, the thesis will explore the 
dilemmas related to the EU’s participation in the reconstruction. Participation of 
external actors in reconstruction processes in third countries is linked to multiple 
contradictions and dilemmas, such as questions of legitimacy, local ownership, and war-
time state structures, as the peacebuilding theory presents. These will be explored in the 
second chapter of this thesis. Dilemmas arise especially when the reconstruction 
approach clashes with the conflict realities on the ground. This introductory chapter 
outlines the reconstruction context in Syria and the Assad government’s approach to the 
reconstruction of the country.  
The research interest for this thesis rose from the researcher’s previous work in a Syria 
peacebuilding project in an NGO. The reconstruction issue became a prominent topic in 




into the topic did not emerge as fast as different policy analyses. Thus the topic was 
seen to need more in-depth analysis, especially from academic point of view.  
Current research on the case of reconstruction of Syria can be divided into two strands: 
1) the physical reconstruction needs of the country, especially its cultural heritage sites
1
, 
and 2) think-tank policy analysis of the political context of the conflict. It is difficult to 
find academic research on the topic beyond these two strands of analysis at the moment. 
Some of the think tank policy analysis will be used to illustrate the conflict context in 
the next chapter, as well as in the conclusions. 
There are some studies that focus on some specific challenges relates to post-conflict 
Syria. For example, Berti (2018) studies the challenges related to stability. According to 
her, the most significant challenges lay in the disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) processes of former combatants, as the proliferation of non-state 
armed groups was a trend in the conflict. Another strand of research is related to the 
public health questions and militarisation of medical care. For example, Meininghaus 
(2016) studies the relationship between health system recovery and emergency aid in 
the context of post-conflict reconstruction. 
Given the lack of academic research, this Master’s thesis can provide systematic 
insights into reconstruction from the perspective of the European Union’s peacebuilding 
approach, as well as to the challenges that external actors face in their participation to 
the reconstruction of conflict countries. These challenges are many, and the next part of 
this chapter will introduce the complexities related to the case of Syria. 
 
1.1 Syria and reconstruction: complex context 
 
What are the physical, social and economic reconstruction needs of Syria? This part 
includes a brief analysis of Assad’s approach to reconstruction of the country and the 
challenges that this poses to the external actors who wish to be part of the reconstruction 
process.  
The widespread destruction in Syria since March 2011 has left many parts of the 
country in ruins. The estimates of the rebuilding range from $250 billion to $400 
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billion. In 2017, around 7% of the housing stock was estimated having being destroyed, 
with 20% partially destroyed. This destruction varies territorially, and besides private 
properties, also medical facilities (16%) and education sector facilities (10%) having 
been fully destroyed. Besides economic crisis, the effects on human lives and 
demographic displacement have been dramatic. While over 5 million Syrian refugees 
are outside of the country, 12 million people inside the country need humanitarian 
assistance, with poverty rate over 90%. In 2017, estimated 400,000 to 470,000 people 
have died. (Daher 2019; Syrian Center for Policy Research 2019; World Bank 2017, ii-
viii.)  
The Syrian government cannot afford the reconstruction by itself. Syria’s GDP declined 
from $61.1 billion in 2010 to $17.1 billion in 2017, with estimated cumulative losses at 
$226 billion. There have also been drops in the purchasing power of Syrian’s, massive 
inflation, a fuel crisis, and a banking crisis.  (World Bank 2017, ii; Daher 2019.) Also, 
government allies Russia and Iran are facing economic problems of their own, which 
makes it harder for them to maintain the level of financial and material support to the 
Syrian government. Both countries have acquired business deals over key sectors of 
Syrian economy, such as mining and infrastructure, but many of these are projects are 
frozen. (Daher 2019.) This had lead to a situation where Russia has repeatedly requested 
the European Union to support the reconstruction process, in return for the return of 
refugees to Syria (e.g. Vohra 2019; Ramani 2019). 
How does the Assad government plan to revitalise the country after such destruction? 
Many researchers suggest that Assad’s model of economic reconstruction defies the 
traditional approaches to post-conflict reconstruction that aims to reconstruct 
dysfunctional and collapsed state institutions. Instead, Assad’s grip on these institutions 
has stayed firm, and the government is using this to ensure its position. According to 
Daher (2019), the Assad government has been looking to consolidate its power and 
security objectives instead of aiming to tackle the country’s economic and social 
challenges. On the contrary, the strategies are aimed at sanctioning government’s 
perceived enemies within the state. Heydemann (2018) describes this process as 
authoritarian stabilisation, where the government uses reconstruction to reimpose its 
authority and control over the Syrian society and economy, as well as altering Syria’s 
demography. The 11.11.11 (2018) report divides the goals into three: two internal 




reconfiguring the social and demographic landscape of the country; the third external 
dimension is the attempt to attract foreign funding from the government’s allies. 
The laws and decrees on housing, land and property issues are central ways in which the 
Assad government has sought to gain politically and economically from the 
reconstruction. The foundation for these is the Decree Number 66 in 2012, which allows 
the Damascus Governorate to expel inhabitants from two areas in the capital. In 2018, 
the government passed Decree Number 10
2
, which expanded the implementation of 
similar policies nationally, thus allowing high-end real estate ventures to emerge on the 
expropriated land. These lands often were formerly held by the opposition. Thus the 
laws that allow for the destruction and expropriation of the property also give way to 
replacing unwanted populations with groups that are more favourable towards the 
government. This is what Daher (2019) calls political retaliation: government’s 
reconstruction and rehabilitation programs are designed to keep unwanted populations 
out of the key areas, and many areas that the government has retaken from the 
opposition have still not been developed. Many of these areas also faced more 
destruction during the conflict than the areas inhabited by people that favoured the 
government. Thus both the destruction during the conflict and the reconstruction after it 
are strategic tools for the government. (Daher 2019; Heydemann 2018b, 3; 11.11.11 
2018, 12-13.) 
In the same time, as many internally displaced persons are prevented from returning to 
their properties, government-allied private sector has been given a leading role in the 
reconstruction through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Thus public assets are largely 
in the hands of the government and its allies. Daher (2019) notes that these policies 
existed before 2011 and emphasised private capital accumulation and liberalised 
economic policies. This neoliberalisation opened the state-managed sectors to 
government-affiliated private economic actors.  Government strongholds, such as 
Tartous and Latakia, are also allocated more funds than other parts of the country. 
(ibid.) 
Based on this analysis, the stakes for participating in the reconstruction for any external 
actor are high. The economic structure of the country, based on the centrality of the 
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government and its network of cronies, would make it hard to prevent the assistance 
being exploited by the cronies to tighten their hold over Syria. Heydemann was not, 
however, hopeful for the leverage the EU was hoping to use to incentivise political 
transition. The penetration of Assad government networks in state institutions would 
mean that even if the political transition starts, official channels will still be under 
control of these actors, which will ensure continuation of corruption. Additionally, 
Assad government has repeatedly rejected European participation in reconstruction 
under other terms than ones set by the government. The legal framework described 
earlier also safeguards government’s connections to any projects carried out under 
reconstruction. (Heydemann 2017.)  
In this context, what is the space for external actors, especially the European Union, to 
participate in or support the reconstruction of Syria? What kind of Syria do they want to 
build? What kind of approach does the EU have? This is the focus of the analysis of the 
EU approach to the reconstruction of Syria. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis identifies the particularities of the European Union’s approach to Syria’s 
reconstruction and explores the dilemmas related to that approach. Firstly, the 
reconstruction will be defined conceptually in the framework of peacebuilding. In the 
second part, the European Union’s peacebuilding approach will be studied from 
theoretical perspective. Also, brief description on the EU-Syria relations will be done to 
give the analysis more background, before moving into the fourth part of the thesis, the 
research framework, which defines the sources and methods of the analysis. The fifth 
part of the thesis will consist of the analysis of the source materials and their 
description. It will describe the EU’s approach to the reconstruction, and reflect it in the 
theoretical framework presented in the chapters before. Lastly, conclusions will reflect 
upon the whole research questions, the possibilities of future research, and the latest 





2. Post-conflict reconstruction: conceptual background 
 
This section aims at constructing a view on how post-conflict reconstruction is treated 
in research and practice. Reconstruction as a concept is seen in the framework of 
peacebuilding, being part of post-conflict activities contributing to building peace and 
sustainable development of a state and society emerging from conflict. Rambostham, 
Woodhouse & Miall (2009, 263-264), as well as Mac Ginty and Williams (2009, 93),  
note that reconstruction efforts should be judged against conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation principles. The chapter first studies the concept of peacebuilding and the 
debate on liberal peace that forms the mainstream approach to peacebuilding in the 
international community. After this, reconstruction will be looked at conceptually as 
well as from the perspective of the external actors’ participation. 
 
2.1 Peacebuilding as a framework for reconstruction 
 
This thesis will use peacebuilding as the framework under which post-conflict 
reconstruction will be defined and analysed. This section outlines the framework and 
defines post-conflict reconstruction, traces the history of post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts, and analyses the role of external actors in reconstruction, especially the so-
called ‘liberal peace’ or ‘liberal interventionism’ features of post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
‘Peacebuilding’ as a concept has many different definitions. One of the earliest 
definitions was the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s (1992) definition of 
post-conflict peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures, which will tend 
to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” More 
recently, peacebuilding has widened to encompass activities that occur during and even 
before the conflict. One example of these broader definitions of peacebuilding is from 
Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009, 8): 
”preventing the resumption or escalation of violent conflict in conflict-prone 
societies and establishing a durable and self-sustaining peace; addressing the 
underlying sources of conflict; building or rebuilding peaceful social 
institutions and values, including respect for human rights; building or 




In these more extensive definitions, peace is not only the absence of violence, a negative 
peace as defined by Galtung (1969), but a more substantial part of social welfare, a positive 
peace, in addition to the negative peace. Peacebuilding supposes that it is possible to build 
peace in the first place.  
Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction has emerged as a field of research, 
mainly after the Cold War. The change in the way the international community builds 
peace has gone hand in hand with how the academic community has studied, analysed 
and criticised it. After the Cold War, the peace operations of the United Nations 
widened their scope from peacekeeping to wider operations aiming to create political, 
economic and social change in post-conflict societies.  These operations aimed at 
supporting the transition of conflict-ridden countries from fragile ceasefire into a stable 
peace. In addition to the proliferation of operations, also more and more actors joined 
them, including regional organisations such as the European Union, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), and non-governmental organisations. However, after the mid-90s, 
these operations were seen too short and limited, and the political and social changes 
they promoted to be too fast. Instead of consolidating the peace, economic reforms and 
organisation of elections on a short notice seemed to cause more instability. As an 
answer to these challenges, it was suggested that by focusing more on strengthening the 
institutions of the states, peacebuilding could become more sustainable. This focus on 
so-called ‘statebuilding’, process of enhancing the capacity, institutions and legitimacy 
of the state, has become one of the main features of peacebuilding today. (Paris 2018, 3-
6; Paris 2010, 340-342; Paris & Sisk 2007, 2-3.)  
These changes in the focus of peacebuilding can be seen in the different ‘generations’ of 
research on peacebuilding. Paris and Sisk (2009) identify three generations: the first 
generation in the 1990s consists of descriptive case studies of peacebuilding missions. 
The second generation appeared in the turn of 1990s and 2000s and consists of more 
theoretical and systematic comparative analyses, critical theories including neo-Marxist 
approaches, securitisation theory, cosmopolitanism, post-structuralism and gender 
theory. The third generation of research can be seen as an emerging emphasis on 
governance, also through the focus on the concept of statebuilding. (Paris & Sisk 2009: 




In the same time as the focus of peacebuilding turned into statebuilding, there was also 
a change in the historical context. Paris (2018,4) notes that even though in the modern 
form of peacebuilding in the 1990s, the operations were multilateral, happened with the 
consent of the conflict states, and aimed at accomplishing full autonomy, there was a 
significant change in peacebuilding after the events of 11 September 2001. After the 
events, fragile and failed states became the most prominent international security threat. 
Fragile and failed states did no longer form a threat to themselves only but to the whole 
region and the international community. According to Paris, this change in policy 
originated in the USA, pinpointed terrorism as the new enemy, and weak states as 
potential places of birth and operations for terrorism. Thus the failed states were 
securitised, and the multilateral peacebuilding operations were not sufficient in 
answering to the security threats. In addition to this, many features linked to failed 
states, such as migration, refugees, war economies, illegal arms trade, lack of health 
care, environmental effects caused by conflicts, potential of aggressive governments 
rising to power, and different environments that allow terrorism, became problems of 
international community, not only these states themselves. As a result, also 
peacebuilding and its adjacent fields such as development and humanitarian work 
became securitised. Peacebuilding could be thus motivated through both humanitarian 
and strategic reasons: in addition to the suffering and human rights violations caused by 
violence, also international stability and security became reasons to build peace in third 
countries. (Paris 2018, 4-5; Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, 3-4, 9-10.) 
According to Paris, after these developments and especially after the cases of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, peacebuilding got a new form that was not so much post-conflict, 
but post-invasion, where the main responsibility was in the hands of the invader. This 
US-led peacebuilding was coexisting with the different type of peacebuilding led by the 
regional organisations and the UN. The latter form was based more on the consent of 
local parties and happened after an agreement had been made. (Paris 2018, 483-484.) 
Thus we can see different forms of peacebuilding emerging, with different roles for 






2.2 Liberal peace and democratic peace theory 
 
As can be seen from the analysis above, peacebuilding is deeply linked to the 
perceptions of what kinds of structures make not only countries but also the 
international system, peaceful. The dominant approach, so-called liberal peace, 
concludes that democracy, liberal market economy and modern state institutions make 
peace (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, 3). This definition is based on a loose shared 
understanding of what ‘democracy’, ‘liberal market economy’ and ‘liberal’ mean, and it 
could be said that liberal peacebuilding is an umbrella of concepts and consists of many 
different understandings of what it means. Paris (2018, 492) explains the prefix ‘liberal’ 
to consist of the attempt to promote democratic governance which includes the 
constitution, elections, political and civil rights, and the rule of law guaranteed by 
independent judiciary, and market-oriented economic reforms, which aim to create 
conditions for long-term economic growth.  
As democracy is one of the key elements of liberal peace, Democratic Peace Theory is 
connecting democracy and peace. According to the Democratic Peace Theory, mature 
democracies do not go to war against each other, because the democratic system limits 
the possibilities of leaders to initiate conflict. The economic interdependency between 
the countries raises the costs of heading into conflict for fear of losing economic and 
trade relations (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, 11.) Democracies also have a unique 
inner peace feature, which means that they can solve their domestic conflicts peacefully. 
Thus the liberal system gets its legitimacy from the respect of human rights: the leaders 
can be changed, which means that they cannot pursue any kind of policies. (Burnell 
2006, 4.) These features explaining the peacefulness of democratic societies can be 
divided into two models: 1) cultural or normative model, in which shared norms and 
cultural features are the base for both peaceful conflict resolution through democratic 
institutions, and reciprocity in peaceful relations; and 2) the structural or institutional 
model, in which the democratic state structures, such as the division of power, limit the 
use of power. (Russet 1995, 35-40.) However, the Democratic Peace Theory does not 
necessarily apply to emerging democracies, or in the relations between democracies and 
non-democracies.  For example Burnell (2006, 2-4) states that fragile new democracies 
are often not able to control the violence of political extremist groups, and the unsettled 





Regardless of these concerns over the transitional phase of democratisation, democratic 
peace has been used in policy levels to promote democracy to build peace in systemic 
levels. When combined with the changes in the international security context, we can 
see that it has also been used to legitimate interventions. This has also been called as the 
hijacking of the liberal peace by neoliberalism and neo-conservatism, which replaces 
the liberal peacebuilding by security-based international intervention, which does not 
keep human rights or democracy as its priorities. (Oxford Research Group 2.7.2019; 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016, 262.)  
Academics have classified this and other types of criticisms in different ways. For 
example, Rambostham, Woodhouse and Miall (2016, 262) use three groups: 
conservatives or rejectionists, criticals, and revisionists. The first group of criticism 
rises from the point of view that failed states should not be saved because this keeps up 
the insecurity. Instead of spreading the threat globally, it should be contained and 
allowed to ‘play out’ by itself within the state in question. The criticals see that liberal 
interventionism is a veiled form of neo-colonialism and creates dependency enforced by 
international institutions. Moreover, finally, the revisionists want to keep the liberal 
peace principles and efforts, claiming that it is irresponsible not to do it. Instead of 
condemning the whole system, there is a need to do it better. (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 
& Miall 2016, 262.)  
The critique can also be seen from the point of view of the division between critical and 
problem-solving theories, as introduced by Robert Cox (1981). According to Cox, 
problem-solving theories aim to solve issues within their perspectives, whereas the 
critical theories are questioning the whole perspective in the first place. In the liberal 
peace, the problem-solving approaches look at its problems from the point of view how 
to make peacebuilding better and more efficient. Critical approaches, on the other hand, 
question the normative base of liberal peacebuilding and the universality and promotion 
of liberal political and economic values. Problem-solving approaches can also be critical 
towards the practice of liberal peacebuilding, but their focus is more on enhancing 
effectiveness in achieving liberal peace. (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, 23; Newman 
2009, 38; Pugh, Cooper & Turner 2008, 391-393.) 
Thus there can be different perspectives on the roles of external actors in peacebuilding and 




Are they focusing on efficiency and technical tasks, are they promoting universal 
values, or are they focusing on local legitimacy? What kind of states and societies do 
they want to build after conflict? Who are legitimate partners? In other words, 
peacebuilding and reconstruction are never value-free. The next chapter focuses on 
exploring these dynamics more by firstly defining reconstruction, and secondly, 
analysing the role of external actors in it. 
2.3 Reconstruction and the role of external actors 
 
The role of external actors is embedded in the concept of reconstruction. It can be taken 
as a given that after a conflict, the devastation in both physical and human domains is so 
great, that external support for states and governments emerging from wars for 
reconstruction is needed (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016, 240; Ball 2001, 
719).  However, external actors can have different reasons for their participation in 
reconstruction efforts. Kahler (2009, 287-288, 294) divides these into three different 
logics: human security, which aim to end conflict and suffering; economic development, 
which focuses on developing good governance; and national security, which focuses on 
mitigating national security threats caused by instability by failed states and terrorism. 
As mentioned above, also Newman, Paris & Richmond (2009, 9-10) give both 
humanitarian and strategic reasons for the participation of external actors. 
Like its umbrella term peacebuilding, also reconstruction can be said to be a somewhat 
ambiguous concept. According to Jabareen (2012, 108-109), post-conflict 
reconstruction theory lacks both theoretical and practical features: it does not have a 
comprehensive theory and definition of the term itself, nor theoretical or practical 
knowledge on planning and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the 
contemporary complex conflicts. Thus we can see that reconstruction is a broad 
concept, as it incorporates the whole spectrum of revitalising states after conflict. It 
includes reconstructing physical, economic and social structures of the state.  
Reconstruction should not be seen only as rebuilding damaged infrastructure, but as a 
concept that encompasses questions of war and peace, economic features of conflict and 
conflict resolution, the role of local, regional and international actors and civil society, 
dealing with psychological trauma, reforming governance structures, and repairing and 
rebuilding social relationships (Ferguson 2010, 2; Mac Ginty & Williams 2009, 134-




relapse into war, while constructing self-sustaining peace and removing structural 
violence. Thus, reconstruction can be seen as building both negative and positive peace 
in Galtungian way. Whereas negative peace is the absence of violence, positive peace 
also encompasses the absence of structural violence and thus could be defined as ‘social 
justice’ (Galtung 1969, 183). It also encompasses both short-term relief and long-term 
development. Reconstruction should also be seen as a highly political phenomenon, as it 
brings about social, cultural, political and economic changes. (Rambostham, 
Woodhouse & Miall, 248; Ferguson 2010, 2; Mac Ginty & Williams 2009, 130-131.)  
As can be seen from its broad definition, post-conflict reconstruction includes various 
efforts that are targeting different fields of society and state structures. A prominent 
approach has been to divide activities in a sectored and sequential manner. 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2016, 252-261) have organised the main features of 
postwar operations into a schema of main sectors and phases from the perspective of a 
reconstruction intervention. Key sectors are security, law and order, government, 
economy, society, and international intervention transitions. The last one addresses the 
relationship between the intervener and the local population and the integration of the 
state into international structures. The temporal phases are 1) intervention, in which 
security is the most critical part, and where the interveners have to deal with the 
immediate trade-offs between short-term and long-term priorities; 2) stabilization, 
which focuses on political stability and governance; and 3) normalization, which 
focuses on economic and socio-cultural sectors, aiming to move the conflict from the 
sphere of violence into a sphere of nonviolent decision-making and (re)integration into 
the international system. (ibid., 252-261.) 
The sequencing approach has been criticised in making reconstruction a “one-size-fits-
all” enterprise, which does not take into account the complexities of local conflict 
settings. Some writers have proposed that instead of making reconstruction a sequence 
of phases in which the move to the next phase will happen after certain activities and 
goals have been fulfilled, we should look at the phases as interlocking and ‘nested’, 
starting and operating side by side (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016: 249).  
A challenge related to conceptualising post-conflict reconstruction is its focus on the 
“post” conflict state. The preposition “post-conflict” refers to a situation, where the 




agreement, even though the literature acknowledges that post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconstruction usually start during the conflict. This is why some authors prefer to use 
the term “postwar” reconstruction, while some do not use any definitions relating 
reconstruction to conflict. As Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2016, 245) note, the 
nature of conflicts in the late 20th and 21st century has changed and become more 
complex.  
When does the state of conflict turn into a post-conflict state? This is a crucial challenge 
for reconstruction according to Mac Ginty and Williams, especially in the context of 
spoiler violence and organised crime that often flourishes in the liminal space between 
war and peace (2009, 137-138). One of the critical challenges in the case of 
reconstruction of Syria is that we cannot define the current state of affairs as post-
conflict or even post-war. When the reconstruction is discussed in the international 
community, it is tied to the political process that will end the conflict and start a new 
phase of reconstructing the country physically, socially, and economically.  
This is linked to the other conceptual issue in the term of “post-conflict reconstruction”, 
which is that sometimes there is more need to construct something than to reconstruct it. 
Thus the prefix ”re“ already suggests that some structures have been destroyed or 
damaged during the conflict and they need to be rebuilt. Sometimes this is not the case, 
but the real need is to build new institutions and structures that answer better to the 
needs of the people. How these needs are defined, is another question, which is linked 
to the question of statebuilding, which is a subconcept of reconstruction. 
In Mac Ginty and Williams’ (2009, 130) reading, statebuilding refers to contemporary 
efforts to reconstruct governance structures in the context of wars that have 
disintegrated the state. Thus statebuilding focuses on governance and economic 
capabilities of the state via reconstructing state structures (Sisk & Paris 2009, 14-15). 
Statebuilding, thus understood as strengthening or constructing legitimate government 
institutions, is one of the major shifts in peacebuilding strategy in the turn of the 21st 
century. According to Sisk & Paris (ibid, 1-2), its basic premise is that to achieve 
security and development, there need to be capable, autonomous and legitimate 
governmental institutions. Without institutional strength, other goals such as reducing 
poverty and improving health and livelihoods, are challenging to achieve. Thus with the 




peacebuilding operations to have longer, broader and deeper scope than before. 
Sustainable peace was seen to be possible through strong governance institutions. In the 
same time, statebuilding became the core of peacebuilding agenda of central 
international organisations such as the UN, World Bank, IMF and the OECD. (Paris & 
Sisk 2007, 2-3.) 
Post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding focus combined with the centrality of the 
concept of fragility as a cause for state failure forms what Heydemann (2018, 6) calls 
the reconstruction orthodoxy. This approach holds that dysfunctional and fragile pre-
war institutions cause violent conflict, which in turn breaks the institutions down and 
creates opportunities for post-conflict governance frameworks that are more effective, 
inclusive and accountable. In this setting, the aim of post-conflict reconstruction is to 
make use of the space that the conflict has created to address the causes of violence 
through institutions, norms and practices. Reconstruction thus transforms the post-
conflict countries into functioning states whose economic features do not stem from 
war. (Heydemann 2018, 6-7.) 
Girod (2016, 1) links the concepts of statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction to 
the 1990s when the aid donors used reconstruction to describe the statebuilding and 
development efforts that happened in the context of transitioning from civil conflict. 
The key events that made the term central in the field were the international 
statebuilding efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Girod says that the aim reconstruction was 
to transform the post-conflict countries into functioning states that have governments 
capable of offering essential public services to their citizens. However, as the progress 
has been very slow or there has not been any progress, some have questioned the 
possibility or desirability of external actors’ participation in post-conflict reconstruction 
(Girod 2016, 1-2). Also Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 126-127) conclude that 
reconstruction cannot be defined outside of the international system and the interests of 
key power holders, which define what needs to be reconstructed and in which way.  
Focus on statebuilding opened a way to a new kind of critique, which questions the 
normative and ethical base of liberal peacebuilding. A key aspect of statebuilding is the 
question of what kind of state is being built. What functions does a state need, and by 
which standards is it judged to be working or failing? This brings us to the core of the 




and Paris (2009, 11-12) regard statebuilding’s links to neo-colonialism and culture of 
dependency as key questions of its future. We can see that the role of external 
intervention and the historical connotations have a significant impact on how actors see 
reconstruction. The western secular and liberal state might not be legitimate or 
appropriate in all contexts. For example, Paris and Sisk (2007, 4-5) raise five central 
tensions and contradictions of statebuilding: 1) external intervention is used to create 
self-governance; 2) external actors define local leaders’ legitimacy; 3) ‘universal’ values 
are promoted as solutions to local problems; 4) statebuilding requires both reforming 
and validating the history; and 5) the short-term imperatives are often contradictory to 
the long-term objectives.  
Central challenges are thus revolving around local ownership or the lack of it, 
promotion of external values, and the conflict between the immediate security 
environment and the needs of long-term development and peace. In other words, the 
critiques of statebuilding approach suggest that it can operate as a Trojan horse to a 
realist, hegemonic agenda that aims to control conflict to stabilize the system, or that it 
is based on a colonialist narrative of modernizing and civilizing third world countries 
that cannot do it themselves (Newman 2009, 30). 
However, for Sisk & Paris (2009, 14-15), statebuilding does not necessarily require 
Western-style democracy or neo-liberal market ideologies. It can also incorporate both 
top-down and bottom-up approaches, as it is, or should be, focused on building 
legitimate institutions. Legitimacy for the government thus stems from both domestic 
and international sources. (ibid., 14-15.) Also, other classifications exist: for example, 
Newman (2009) divides peacebuilding into transformative, realist and liberal forms. Of 
these, the first is based on bottom-up conflict resolution, whereas the second focuses on 
upholding international security and creation of strong states through top-down 
processes. The last one is divided into two forms: Wilsonian peacebuilding is based on 
promoting democracy and market economies in building peace and stability, but the 
choice is still with the people themselves; and hegemonic neo-liberal peacebuilding, in 
which the political and economic norms of international actors are promoted at the 
expense of local actors, who might be included only to legitimize the externally-placed 




Paris and Sisk (2009, 3) suggest that instead of looking at statebuilding as a sequence of 
actions, dilemma analysis can be used as a way to analyse statebuilding as an event full 
of contradictions that actors must solve. They also suggest that in most cases, the 
challenge is to find a way to balance different imperatives and finding a solution that is 
closest acceptable for them. These contradictions include the use of outside intervention 
to foster self-government; using international control to establish local ownership; 
promoting universal values as remedies for local problems; dealing with the past; and 
the conflict between short-term imperatives and longer-term objectives. (Paris & Sisk 
2009, 13-14, 305-306, 311.) Also, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2016) raise 
contradictions as a good lens to use in analysing postwar peace interventions. They note 
that a dilemma consists of mutually exclusive options, which is not often the case in 
peacebuilding, and thus prefer to use the word contradiction instead.  For them, 
peacebuilding situations consist of contradictions, tensions and tradeoffs that are 
unavoidable and uncomfortable. Analysing them can be useful in capturing complexity 
of conflict and challenges that the reconstruction process faces. (Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse & Miall 2016, 247-248.) 
It is in the aim of this thesis to explore these dilemmas and contradictions of the 
European Union’s approach to the reconstruction of Syria. This will be done through 
analysing the approach that the European Union has towards Syria’s reconstruction 
based on the publicly available foreign policy documents, and how the EU presents 
itself in the conflict. Before this analysis, a brief analysis of three issues will follow.  
Firstly, what is the EU’s approach to peacebuilding and through which institutions it 
operates. Secondly, what kind of actor is the EU in its foreign relations and its 
peacebuilding? What kind of roles does it take and present of itself? Moreover, thirdly, 
what has been the EU’s policy towards Syria in the framework of the EU 
neighbourhood policy and how has the reconstruction emerged as a topic in the conflict 








3 European Union, reconstruction and Syria 
 
This chapter analyses the European Union’s approach to peacebuilding and 
reconstruction. Firstly, it will define the key EU institutions, their roles and 
responsibilities that are related to the EU foreign policy in conflicts and peacebuilding. 
Secondly, it will analyse the approach that the EU has for peacebuilding through 
identifying key approaches to conflict and the measures that are taken to prevent, 
resolve and manage conflicts. Small cases of EU participation in reconstruction 
processes will be presented. After this, what kind of norms does the EU promote in its 
peacebuilding approach and how does it present itself as an actor will be analysed 
through the framework of normative power. Next, the analysis will focus on what has 
been the EU’s policy towards Syria in the foreign policy framework. Lastly, a brief 
timeline of the EU in the Syrian conflict will be drawn with a focus on the years when 
the reconstruction has been a prominent topic, 2016-2019. Through these subchapters, a 
comprehensive picture of the EU’s peacebuilding approach will be presented as a 
background for the upcoming analysis on the case of reconstruction of Syria.  
It should be noted, that the aim of this thesis is not to study the dynamics of how the EU 
peacebuilding approach or the reconstruction stance towards the reconstruction of Syria 
has been formulated through the institutions and the Member states, but to describe the 
main institutions that guide, operate and implement peacebuilding, and to introduce the 
elements of the approach and their normative dimensions. Later in the analysis, the 
approach towards Syria will be analysed through the publicly available documents more 
in-depth and reflected on the perspectives presented in this chapter. 
 
3.1 EU Foreign Policy and peacebuilding 
 
Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys (2010, 2) trace the beginning of the EU’s contribution to 
peacebuilding being fairly recent, but the development has been rapid in developing 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established by the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) in 1993. The Treaty created the European Union composed of 
three pillars: the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
and Justice and Home Affairs. The emergence of the Lisbon Treaty (signed 13 




personality and an institutional structure for its external service, as well as eliminated 
the pillar structure. It also created new actors within the CFSP, such as the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and permanent 
President of the European Council. (European parliament 2019b.) It also created the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic service, which aim was 
to “promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world, contributing to 
peace, security and the sustainable development of the Earth, to preserve peace, prevent 
conflict and to strengthen international security”. This expanded the scope of tasks 
related to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and post-conflict 
stabilisation, under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). (Duke & 
Courtier 2010, 48.) The EEAS consists of officials in Brussels, as well as the EU 
delegations to third countries and international organisations. It is led by the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European 
Commission (HR/VP). The EEAS has a role in designing and implementing the EU 
foreign policy, and contributes to the programming and management of different 
instruments, such as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), European 
Development Fund (EDF), European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). (EPLO 2019, 13-14.) 
The European Council, consisting of the heads of governments or states, the President 
of the European Commission and the President of the European Council, identifies the 
EU’s strategic interests and determines the objectives of the CFSP. The Council of the 
European Union, on the other hand, is the institution that represents Member States in 
the EU, is a legislative body and shares the budgetary authority with the European 
Parliament. It is the controlling body of the EU foreign policy, consisting of Member 
States ministers and European Commissioners. The Foreign Affairs Council has the 
most responsibility for the EU’s response to conflict, including areas of humanitarian 
assistance, development, neighbourhood and enlargement negotiations, trade and 
defence policy, and CFSP. (EPLO 2019, 3, 6.) The European Parliament, the only 
directly elected body of the EU, shares the decision-making power with the Council of 
the European Union in most areas under the Community competence, but in the areas 
under CFSP, it has no legislative power. In CFSP, the Council is the main decision-




Thus the parliament can make decisions related to development policy and the political 
framework for common commercial policy, as well as in the context of the long-term 
budget, and it can affect the external funding instruments, including those that fund 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention. (EPLO 2019, 38-40.) 
The European Commission, which has administrative, executive, legislative and 
representative responsibilities, consists of the College of Commissioners and the 
administrative body. It is comprised of 31 directorate generals (DGs), which deal with 
various topics. Of these, five deal with external relations: Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement negotiations (DG NEAR), International Cooperation and Development 
(DG DEVCO), Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO), Trade, and the 
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI). (EPLO 2019, 22.) 
The service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) was created at the same time as the 
EEAS and is reporting to the HR/VP. Instruments under it relevant to peacebuilding 
include for example the Partnership Instrument (PI), Instrument contributing to Stability 
and Peace (IcSP), sanctions policy, and Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments 
(RPBA) and Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA). The PI, adopted in 2014, is an 
instrument that promotes EU’s strategic interests through financing key areas such as 
competitiveness, research and innovation and migration, as well as deals with EU’s 
economic diplomacy (European Commission 2019b). The IcSP, which succeeded the 
Instrument for Stability in 2014, supports stabilisation initiatives and peacebuilding 
activities in the areas of crisis response, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis 
preparedness, as well as responses to global, transregional and emerging threats 
(European Commission 2019d). The RPBA and PDNA are guided by joint declaration 
signed by the EU, UN and World Bank since 2008, to mobilize the institutions and 
coordinate post-crisis recovery frameworks to enhance resilience, answer recovery 
needs and strengthen capacities of national institutions for effective prevention, 
response and recovery, in countries recovering from natural disasters or conflict-related 
crises (European Commission 2019a). Sanctions, or restrictive measures, can be 
prepared by the EEAS and agreed by the Council of the European Union. They can 
include arms embargoes, trade restrictions, financial restrictions, and restricting 
movement targeting third countries or non-state entities and individuals, for example 




Lastly, one of the key areas in the EU foreign and security policy is the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which emerged in 2004. The ENP now targets all 
immediate neighbours to the EU: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, 
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The relations are built through bilateral 
relationship through individualised Action Plans. (Björkdahl, Richmond & Kappler 
2009, 10.) In addition to the differentiated bilateralism, other key mechanisms for the 
cooperation are conditionality and socialisation. Since 2008, the ENP also consists of 
two sub-regional components, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) initiative. The prime objective of the ENP was to strengthen stability, 
security and well-being in the neighbourhood, but also to contribute to the resolution of 
protracted crises. (Schumacher 2017, 3.)  
The motivations for the EU’s promotion of regional cooperation vary from ad hoc 
responses to long-term strategic objectives. One of the reasons is the belief that regional 
cooperation will foster and consolidate peace and economic growth. This is a mixture of 
multilateralism and regionalism, as the regional integration would lead to integrating 
developing countries to world economy as well. We can also see the objectives of 
strengthening human rights and democracy. (Björkdahl, Richmond & Kappler 2009, 
84.) Tocci (2007, 8) notes that while the EU’s self-image as a normative power would 
promote values as ends in themselves, there are other interests as well to promote peace, 
democracy, rights and law in its neighbourhood. Due to the proximity of the region and 
potential spillover effects, the stability and security of the EU can be threatened in the 
absence of mutually agreed settlements between the EU and neighbouring countries. 
These threats can include political violence, radicalism, uncontrolled asylum and 
refugee flows, accelerated migration, disrupted commercial flows and damaged energy 
security. Tensions within Europe can also be fuelled, especially regarding the Muslim 
communities in member states. (ibid., 8.) 
Schumacher (2017) argues that after 2015 the ENP’s ambitious policies on promotion 
of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights have been turned 
down, partially due to the developments in the southern region, but also due to the 
failures in empowering civil society, inconsistent use of conditionality, as well as 
inability to ”offer attractive and effective substitutes for political accession 




in its Mediterranean neighbourhood. (Schumacher 2017, 3-5.) Richmond, Björkdahl & 
Kappler (2011, 460) express concerns that if the neighbourhood policy does not take 
into account the differences in the local context, it will only replicate the standard 
liberal peace prescriptions, which raises questions whether the EU should be doing 
statebuilding and security-oriented operations in the first place. 
Smith (2003, 86) divides the main instruments that the EU uses for the regional 
cooperation into economic assistance, cooperation agreements, group-to-group political 
dialogue, and conditionality. Conditionality means the linking between the perceived 
benefit to the fulfilment of conditions, often relating to the protection of human rights 
and advancing democratic principles. This conditionality can be both positive and 
negative.  Tocci (2010) defines positive conditionality as a promise of a benefit that will 
be given when a predetermined condition is fulfilled. This fulfilment must happen either 
before the benefit is granted, or during the granting, when the benefit may be withdrawn 
or suspended if the conditions are not respected. Negative conditionality, on the other 
hand, means inflicting a punishment in the event of violating some specific conditions. 
This can include diplomatic and economic sanctions. Tocci also notes that the EU has a 
preference over positive conditionality and the need to fulfil the requirements before the 
benefit is granted (ex-ante conditionality). Reasons for this include the preference to 
keep political channels open and imposing less challenge to the sovereignty to a third 
country, as well as the actual amount of shortcomings in the field of conflict, democracy 
and human rights, which, in case of taken strictly, could lead to suspension of many 
agreements. (Tocci 2010, 66-68.) Interestingly, as Smith (2003, 84) notes, in the same 
time as democracy, regional peace and security, economic stability and political 
commitment are the objectives for regional cooperation, they are the conditions for the 
cooperation in the first place. Whitman and Wolff (2012, 215) note that the EU has not 
been using conditionality in its grants in many cases, for example in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Moldova, Arab-Israeli conflict and Cyprus. This would also indicate about the 
EU’s reluctance to impose strong conditionalities, which contrasts with the case of 
Syria. 
These foreign policy structures, instruments and principles form the basis through 
which the EU approaches peacebuilding and its external relations. How are these 
present in the case of Syria? As will be seen in the later analysis, the EU has used 




operationalised? What preconditions exist that need to be fulfilled? The later analysis 
will answer these questions, as well as reflect on the EU’s approach to Syria in the 
context of its European Neighbourhood Policy.  Before that, the EU’s more spesific 
approach to peacebuilding is analysed. 
3.1.1 EU and peacebuilding 
 
What is the EU’s approach to peacebuilding? What concepts and tools does it include? 
In which context does the case of Syria fit in? In the following section the EU approach 
to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and mediation and dialogue, which are interlinked 
in the EU approach, are analysed. The EU’s approach has been divided into three 
features: its lack of coherent conceptualization, its wide range of policy instruments, and 
its rootedness in the history of the EU itself as a peace project.  
In the analyses of the EU’s peacebuilding approach, one kind of consensus is that there 
is no one coherently conceptualised approach to peacebuilding that can be translated 
into practice (Richmond, Björkdahl & Kappler 2011, 450). On the other hand, the 
analysis of the EU peacebuilding practice had been, according to Visoka & Doyle 
(2016, 862), “placed within traditional instruments of security governance, such as 
conflict prevention and mediation, crisis management, post-conflict stabilization and 
normative frameworks, such as human rights, human security and civilian protection.” 
Developing coherent approach to peacebuilding and conflict prevention is a slow 
process according to Smith (2003, 155), who argued in pre-Lisbon Treaty era, that the 
slowness reflects partly the weaknesses in the EU’s foreign policy system. After her 
writing, the EU’s foreign policy institutions have been strengthened, most notably 
through the EEAS and the HR/VP. Richmond, Björkdahl & Kappler (2011, 451) 
emphasise that the Lisbon Treaty itself states the connection between the EU and peace, 
as well as the role of the EU in peace promotion, conflict prevention and security. The 
new emerging peacebuilding framework is based on sustainable peace, human security, 
responsibility to protect, effective multilateralism, partnership and local ownership and 
national capacity. Promotion of democracy and human rights and strengthening civil 
society are also crucial issues. (ibid., 451.) 
Duke and Courtier (2012, 22) argue that the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding is 
multifaceted, especially when it is linked to the general debate about security, which 




prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation, as well as sustainable peace 
and development. Peacebuilding is thus a part of the EU conflict prevention strategy 
and the activities aiming to create conditions for sustainable peace. The EU engages in 
peacebuilding both within its region, as well as in the connected regions and other 
regions linking with the member state interests or where conflict issues are urgent or 
called for by other international peacebuilding actors such as the UN. (Richmond, 
Björkdahl & Kappler 2011, 455.) Smith (2003, 145) notes that the EU’s preference for 
conflict prevention arises partly from the lack of military options for managing 
conflicts. However, after the development of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), the EU has a military wing to deal with crisis management and security issues. 
Peacebuilding is centrally linked to medium and long-term approaches aiming to 
address the root causes of violent conflicts and creating conditions for peace within 
states and contributing to inter-state peace (Smith 2003, 145). These root causes can 
include  
”an imbalance of political, socio-economic or cultural opportunities 
among different identity groups (ethnic, religious, regional, social, etc.); a 
lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance; the 
absence of effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group 
interests (including democratic structures) and for bridging dividing lines 
between different interest groups; and the lack of a vibrant civil society”  
(Duke & Courtier 2010, 24) 
The root causes can be clustered into the legitimacy of the state, the rule of law, respect 
for fundamental rights, civil society and media, relations between communities and 
dispute-solving mechanisms, sound economic management, social and regional 
inequalities, and the geopolitical situation. (Duke & Courtier 2010, 24.) They also note 
that peacebuilding is increasingly seen as part of the post-conflict transition phase and 
building reconciliation and peace. This means that it can include various features such 
as peacekeeping operations, capacity building, planning and training of peace support 
operations, DDR, fighting illegal arms and organised crime, governance reforms, 
human rights and democracy, police missions, and parliamentary oversight. 
(ibid., 29.) For Duke and Courtier (2010, 26) the distinctive feature of the EU’s 




before, during and after conflict. The EU has a wide range of policy instruments it can 
wield in its peacebuilding operations, which stems from the combined efforts of the 
member states (Smith 2003, 154).  
As an example of an instrument targeting post-conflict reconstruction, the European 
Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) operated in Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, as well 
as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between the years 2000 and 2008. It 
was an independent agency of the EU, accountable to the Council and the Parliament. 
Its programmes targeted supporting good governance, institution building, the rule of 
law, as well as the development of a market economy. Even though its main focus was 
strengthening the state institutions and capacities, it also invested in physical 
infrastructure, environmental protection, social development and strengthening of civil 
society. (Voorhoeve 2007, 156-157.) 
Another example that can illustrate how the EU uses its wide array of tools from crisis 
management, to political and developmental tools, is the case of EU peacebuilding in 
Afghanistan. Many challenges in the conflict setting, such as the war-like environment, 
overwhelming political and military lead by other actors, as well as centralised structure 
of governance which alienates majority of the population and forms a legitimacy gap 
between the population and the formal government institutions, are relevant in other 
contexts as well (Gross 2010, 308). In the case of Syria, we can see that the continuing 
conflict state and the changing domestic, regional and international power balance 
affects the EU’s peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. 
In Afghanistan, the EU was engaged in multiple fronts: the Commission oversaw 
programmes focusing on economic development, governance and the rule of law; the 
EU Special Representative (EUSR) filled a more political role of coordinating and 
shaping the EU’s political position, as well as being the visible political actor on the 
ground; the EUPOL Afghanistan, the ESDP police mission launched in 2007, was led 
initially by Italy but later by the Council; and finally, the Election Observation Mission 
(EOM) in 2009. (Gross 2010, 302.) Gross (ibid., 309) notes that the EU was able to 
deliver a comprehensive set of political, economic and civilian crisis management tools 
in Afghanistan, but the inter-institutional divides have made the coherence and 




Also Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler (2011, 457) note that this wide range of tools 
and instruments can contribute to the lack of coherence in the EU’s peacebuilding 
approach, where for example security, policing and promotion of the rule of law is 
under ESDP, democratisation and human rights promotion under the Commission, the 
diplomatic role under CSFP, and the donor role of the EU varies. (ibid., 457) 
The broad scope of peacebuilding activities is thus in the same time an opportunity for 
the EU to engage in many aspects of peacebuilding, but in the same time having a 
coordinated and coherent peacebuilding approach seems to be complicated. This is one 
of the key features of the EU’s peacebuilding approach. 
Another distinctive feature of the approach is the added value that the idea of European 
integration as a peacebuilding project brings to the EU. The EU sees itself as an 
exemplar, and this has implications to its external peacebuilding efforts. Also Smith 
(2003) notes that the EU approach’s uniqueness has been on exporting its model of 
conflict prevention: the emphasis on multilateralism and regional cooperation. The 
legitimacy and authority of the EU in conflict prevention has been stemming from its 
role as a model for other regions. This she calls the civilian method of preventing 
conflict. (Smith 2003, 170.) 
Similarly, Tocci (2010) frames the EU’s role in conflict settings in two ways. The first 
is that the framework of governance, law and policy can offer a conducive context for 
peacebuilding. The second is that through its policy instruments, the EU can create 
incentives for peacebuilding. Thus the first role is the role of a framework, whereas the 
second role is more of an actor itself. (Tocci 2010, 60.) Visoka & Doyle (2016) argue 
that the EU’s peacebuilding approach should not be studied only through the lens of 
liberal peacebuilding, but rather as “self-mirroring of its internal dynamics of neo-
functional integration and consolidation”.  This means that the EU’s external actions are 
based on the externalisation of its self-perception of the formation of peace in Europe to 
other parts of the world. (Visoka & Doyle 2016, 863.) This experience also affects how 
the EU would prefer conflicts to be solved. Tocci (2007, 8) lists the EU’s preferred 
solutions as 1) federal and power-sharing solutions to secessionist conflicts; 2) 
integration of the minority communities through the extension of individual and 




depending on the conflict context, but the first option being the most popular and the 
last one the least.  
This so-called ‘European experience’ as a legitimator and motivator for the EU 
peacebuilding is an essential part of the EU’s identity as a peacebuilder. We will get 
back to this in later chapter. Before that one more question should be answered: is the 
EU’s approach to peacebuilding similar to the mainstream liberal peacebuilding? 
Through the lens of liberal peacebuilding, the EU’s peacebuilding approach seems to 
have many similarities. The basic assumptions of the root causes of conflict as well as 
the appropriate measures to address them, such as democratisation, respect for human 
and minority rights, sustainable economic development and regional cooperation, shape 
the EU’s policies on conflict prevention. These measures fit well into the framework of 
liberal peacebuilding and liberal peace, as can be seen from the above chapters. Also, as 
presented above, these measures do not come without challenges related to the 
destabilising effects of democratisation, the possibility of creating more inequalities 
through development or economic assistance. However, how similar is the EU’s 
approach similar to the liberal peacebuilding consensus which was presented above?  
Richmond, Björkdahl & Kappler (2011, 452) note that the emerging EU peacebuilding 
framework has complied with the liberal peace and its key components, including needs 
for stable states, security, rights, institutions, the rule of law, civil society and 
development. They say that while the peacebuilding framework is framed by the aims of 
liberal peacebuilding, it also has more emancipatory aims of transcending the state via 
regional integration. (ibid. 455.)  While the EU’s normative and ideal version of peace 
that includes a just and durable peace based on civil rights and society, and an ambition 
for more complex engagement, can be seen in the light of normative power, the EU 
seems to equate building this kind of peace with building liberal or neoliberal states. 
This approach when transferred to post-conflict zones, has not been able to make 
significant impact in creating more emancipator version of peace.  Even though the EU 
is utilising statebuilding elements, Richmond, Björkdahl & Kappler (2011) note that the 
EU’s approach diverges significantly from the general statebuilding praxis with its 
emphasis on rights and needs of the people in social and cultural contexts. This 




These steps outside of the mainstream peacebuilding approaches would suggest, in the 
eyes of Richmond, Björkdahl & Kappler (2011, 460), extending the liberal 
peacebuilding into social justice, human security and welfare and more sensitive 
engagements with other actors in the contextual dynamics of conflict areas. This would 
require normative legitimacy from the EU. The EU has been described as a civil power 
and lately as a normative power, based on the measures in its use and how it represents 
itself. The constitution of the identity of the EU and the principles it promotes in its 
international relations are interlinked, the two sides of the same coin. Thus the 
following section will give background to the later analysis of the EU approach towards 
the reconstruction of Syria. 
 
3.1.2 Normative and civil power: EU as a peacebuilder 
 
This chapter outlines the role of the European Union in its international relations 
through the concepts of civil and normative power. The EU has been presented as a 
different kind of international actor, and that represents a new kind of power in world 
politics. In defining what that means, the first definition was that the EU is a civil 
power, based on its preference of using diplomatic and economical means instead of 
military ones. However, later in the 2000s, Ian Manners’ (2000) notion of ’Normative 
Power Europe’ has become a stable part of the analyses of the EU and its international 
relations.  
Manners’ notion of the EU as a normative power is an answer to the debate whether the 
EU is or should be a civilian power or a military power. He defines the features of 
civilian power as 1) primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international conflicts; 
2) the centrality of economic power to achieve national objectives; 3) the willingness to 
use legally-binding supranational institutions in achieving international progress. The 
debate about what kind of an actor the EU is and what is its relation to being a state-like 
actor forms the context for Manners’ argument, that the EU is not a civilian power that 
focuses on utilising economic tools, nor military power, but a normative power that is 
characterised by shared principles. He defines normative power as the ”ability to shape 
or change what passes for normal in international relations” (Manners 2000, 26-32.)  
The concept of normative power Europe, for Manners (2000, 31), means that the EU is 




relations. This normative basis consists of founding principles, such as liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law; of 
tasks and objectives, such as social progress, discrimination and sustainable 
development; of stable institutions, through guarantee of democracy, rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and protection of minorities; and of fundamental 
rights, such as dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizenship and justice. This basis 
represents the constitutive features of the EU, whose identity is being more than a state. 
(ibid., 33.) Then, what normative principles does the EU promote in its international 
policies? Manners (2007, 68-74) lists these as sustainable peace, social freedom, 
consensual democracy, associative human rights (both individual and collective), 
supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, 
good governance. Finally, these principles are promoted through diffusion, strategic and 
declaratory communications, the institutionalisation of relationship, exchange of 
benefits, physical presence of EU in third states and organisations, and cultural 
diffusion and political learning. This forms the normative power of Europe. (Manners 
2000, 35.) 
Whitman (2013, 182) notes that the normative power in the context of peace and 
conflict resolution emphasises non-military, economic, social and humanitarian 
instruments, addressing structural causes and violent symptoms, can combine short- and 
long-term goals and instruments, and develop local capacity ownership. According to 
Lucarelli and Menotti (2006, quoted in Whitman 2013, 182) normative power can form 
interventions into political and economical construction and legal frameworks with 
acceptable terms by the parties. 
The normative power has also faced criticism. Whitman (2013, 177) identifies the 
critique coming especially from structuralist-realist and rationalist scholars: they reject 
the possibility of the EU having separate actorness to its member states, instead serving 
as an instrument for its most influential member states, and the role and importance of 
values and principles in the world politics in the first place. The actorness of the EU is 






“--- there is no one EU identity – the EU cannot be considered a 
‘difference engine’ in the multiplication of a separate, single, essential, 
categorical, supranational EU self. It is the fluid, complex, multiple and 
relational aspects of the self–other contestations which define the EU as a 
normative power, rather than the other way round.” 
In this thesis, the self-description is necessarily focused on the way the EEAS and 
particularly the HR/VP presents the EU approach and identity concerning the 
reconstruction of Syria. The study does not aim to claim to gain insights into a single 
EU ’self’ that can be analysed through the source documents. Instead, it rather aims to 
analyse the image or the description that the EU presents of itself in the case. 
Additionally, in this thesis, the aim is not to analyse the normative power of the EU in 
the context of Syria per se, but to use the concept as support in analysing what is the 
approach of the EU towards the reconstruction of Syria. The normativity would be seen 
in the principles that the EU promotes in reconstruction, as well as in how it presents 
itself as an actor in the conflict. Does its credibility as an actor rise from its values or 
from its actions? Additionally, can we find other than normative motivations? Would 
this be a continuation of the EU’s foreign and peacebuilding policy, or would it contrast 
with it? To support this analysis, the following chapter focuses on the relations between 
the EU and Syria.  
 
3.2 EU and Syria  
 
In this research, the aim is to look at the norms and values that are linked to the vision 
of future post-conflict Syria. What kind of Syria is the European Union willing to build, 
and what not? What kind of elements is the EU willing to accept, and what elements 
prevent it from participating? This will be done through looking at the vision the EU 
presents for future Syria, and the preconditions it sets for its participation, support and 
financing of reconstruction. Before going to the case study, the relationship between the 
EU and Syria in the institutional framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy is 
analysed. After this, a brief timeline of the EU in the Syrian conflict will be drawn. It 
encompasses the years under analysis, 2016-2019, when the reconstruction discussion 




3.2.1 European Neighbourhood Policy and Syria 
 
From the European Union’s perspective, Syria can be seen through the lens of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding, but also through the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
as a part of the EU’s southern neighbourhood. On the other hand, since the conflict, it 
can also be seen through the EU’s relations with its southern neighbourhood of the 
Middle East and North Africa have been formalised since mid-1990s in several ways. 
One of the key aims has been to consolidate prosperity, stability and security in the 
neighbourhood. Through Euro-Mediterranean partnerships and financial assistance 
instruments, the EU has supported economic development, readdressing socioeconomic 
imbalances, good governance, and human rights reforms. In 2003, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) emerged to cover both eastern and southern 
neighbourhoods with aim to strengthen the EU’s contribution to conflict resolution at 
the regional level. (Duke & Courtier 2010, 36; Tocci 2010, 59.) Smith (2003, 76-77) 
notes that the EU was trying to construct a Mediterranean identity based on the 
European Community model of functional cooperation, but with little success as the 
internal and external conflicts are damaging the region and the European agricultural 
protectionism and tough anti-immigration policies are not encouraging closer 
cooperation.  In 2015, the ENP was reviewed, and it was seen that its security 
dimension needed to be strengthened due to the rising number of conflicts and 
destabilisation in the neighbourhood, which had caused unprecedented migratory flows 
towards Europe (Koenig 2017, 358). 
Like its peacebuilding approach, also the ENP has been criticised of the lack of 
coherence. As the ENP is a policy that encompasses multiple objectives, such as 
security, economic prosperity and democracy, and cuts across different functional areas 
and governance levels, it raises coherence challenges that are horizontal, institutional 
and vertical. Especially horizontal coherence is essential in the context of Syria: 
between CFSP, CSDP, humanitarian aid and crisis management fields such as migration 
management and counter-terrorism. Institutional coherence refers to collaborative 
interaction between EU-level institutional actors, whereas the vertical coherence refers 
to the coherence between the neighbourhood and crisis management policies are 




Koenig (2017) evaluates the coherence challenges in the case of Syria during the years 
2011-2015. Before the conflict, Syria was a member of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) and a founding member of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 
At the beginning of the conflict, the EU response was coherent: it used diplomatic 
declarations, froze the draft Association Agreement and suspended all bilateral 
cooperation programmes, as well as imposed autonomous sanctions and restrictive 
measures. The sanctions regime became to include an arms embargo, an oil import 
embargo, asset freezes and travel bans. (Koenig 2017, 362-363.) 
According to Koenig (2017) that the EU’s initial unity crumbled in 2013 when the 
conflict turned more deadly and caused a severe humanitarian disaster. In March, 
France and the UK started pushing for lifting the arms embargo to arm moderate rebel 
groups whereas other member states were sceptical. Eventually the situation was ended 
in compromise, which eased the arms embargo without immediate weapon delivery but 
maintained other sanctions. This was seen as a serious blow to the EU’s foreign policy 
and is approach to the Syrian conflict, and soon after the EU institutions attempted to 
increase the coherence through a joint communication on bringing the EU and member 
states policies and instruments together to a more coherence approach. In August, the 
chemical weapons attack in Ghouta divided member states again: The UK and France 
were signalling support for a US-led air campaign against the Assad government, but 
others focused on condemning the attacks. (Koenig 2017, 363-364.) 
The years 2014-2015 brought three interlinked developments that made the Syrian crisis 
even more linked to Europe. First one was the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS, later also known as Islamic State, IS). The second one was the ISIS-linked 
terrorist attack in neighbouring and European countries. Moreover, the third one was the 
unprecedented increase of Syrian refugees heading towards Europe. As an answer to 
these developments, the European Commission and the HR/VP published an ‘EU 
regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat’. In addition, funds for 
regional response, strengthening the moderate opposition and humanitarian assistance 
were allocated through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the ‘Madad’ 
Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis. (Koenig 2017, 364-365.) 
Koenig (2017, 365) notes that the vertical coherence was challenged the most by the 




solve it faced resistance. The EU could not provide the necessary financial bridge 
between emergency and longer-term aid, and the member states could not agree on 
coordinated political strategy, a collective military contribution or sustainable ways to 
support and manage refugees. (ibid.) 
This short description of the EU response to the Syrian crisis in the early years of the 
conflict form the background for the emergence of the discussion on the reconstruction. 
In the early years, the focus was majorly on the humanitarian crisis, ISIS, and internal 
security and migration-related issues. However, in 2016 the focus had also turned back 
to the political process and the vision for the future. The next chapter will outline the 
EU engagement to the discussion on the reconstruction of Syria and the future of the 
country. 
 




In 2016, when the reconstruction stance emerged in the aftermath of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 2254 from December 2015, the EU started to strengthen its 
role around the conflict and its resolution. The Geneva process and its key features 
become to form the pre-conditions for supporting the reconstruction of Syria. The 
Geneva process is led by the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, guided by the 
Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). The resolution mandates the UN facilitation of 
the political process, with a focus on governance, a constitutional committee, and UN-
supervised elections, as well as calls for the transition to happen within six months, and 
the elections within 18 months.
4
 
The resolution emphasises an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the 
legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. The resolution also calls for the 
                                                     
3
 This chapter utilises the materials from the EU sources. These materials and their use will be explained 
in the next chapter that introduces the research framework. However, for the structure of the thesis, this 
timeline description/analysis is placed before the other analysis chapters to provide sufficient background 
information for the the reader. 
 
4
 The Geneva talks originated to the year 2012, when the first UN Special Envoy for Syria, Kofi Annan, 
submitted a six-point plan to the UN Security Council, which called for a Syrian-led political process. 
The first round of negotiations, so called Geneva I, start in 2012 and are followed by Geneva II in 2014, 
Geneva III in 2016,  Geneva IV in 2017, and Geneva V-VIII in 2017 and onwards. Kofi Annan was 
followed by Lakhdar Brahimi as the UN and Arab League envoy for Syria in August 2012, who resigned 
May 13 2014. He was replaced by Staffan de Mistura in July. Later in January 2018, he was followed by 





implementation of the Geneva Communiqué from 2012. The 2012 Geneva 
Communiqué is the final communiqué of the Action Group for Syria, which convened 
in Geneva on 30 June 2012.
5
 (United Nations A/66/865–S/2012/522 2012, 2.) The 
Communiqué identified the Action Group’s common objectives as “to work urgently 
and intensively to bring about an end to the violence and human rights abuses, and to 
facilitate the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets 
the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and 
democratically to determine their own future.”  
To facilitate these objectives, the Communiqué identified steps and measures to secure 
implementation of UNSCR 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), agreed on principles and 
guidelines for a political transition “that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian 
people”, and agreed on actions to support the Joint Special Envoy’s efforts to facilitate a 
Syrian-led political process.  
Through implementing the Communiqué, the UNSCR 2254 calls for the establishment 
of an inclusive transitional governing body, which will be formed based on mutual 
consent and should ensure continuity of governmental institutions. The resolution 
requests the UN Secretary-General, through the Special Envoy for Syria, to convene 
representatives of Syrian government and opposition to engage in negotiations on a 
political transition process. The resolution also calls for protection of ethnic and 
religious groups, ensuring humanitarian access, conditions for the safe and voluntary 
return of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), and adherence to international 
law. (UNSCR 2254 2015.) 
The EU also enhanced its role as a regional actor. In October 2016, Mogherini initiated 
a process of talks with the regional actors on the future of Syria and the post-conflict 
state, aiming to complement the official negotiation track of Geneva and to create 
political space for common ground. These regional actors include Turkey, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Lebanon. (EEAS 2016c.) 
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 The Action Group consisted on the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab 
States, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, Russia, the UK, the USA, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait 
and Qatar and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
The meeting was chaired by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States 




The next year, 2017, forms an important phase for the EU role in Syria. The EU stepped 
up its role through several ways: in the form of the EU Regional Initiative and the first 
Brussels conference to support Syria, through launching its strategy for Syria, as well as 
preparing for post-agreement planning on Syria, and consolidating its role among 
different efforts to solve the conflict, such as the Astana process and the Geneva 
process. However, the principal aim for all these complementary channels was to push 
all actors towards Geneva. 
2017 was also a significant phase in the conflict itself: the Geneva negotiations became 
deadlocked, Russia, Turkey and Iran launched the Astana process, ISIS faces significant 
defeat in Syrian territory, and the Assad government starts to gain back majority of the 
Syrian territory. The Astana process, which operated as an alternative peace talks 
channel and focused on ceasefires, included the Syrian government and several rebel or 
opposition factions. The Astana guarantors, Russia, Iran and Turkey, signed a 
memorandum which established four ‘de-escalation zones’ in Syria. This memorandum 
is not signed by the conflict parties, but the guarantors have the responsibility to ensure 
and observe the ceasefire. (Yacoubian 2019.) 
For the EU, 2017 consisted majorly in consolidating its approach to Syria and the 
reconstruction. The EU strategy for Syria was presented by the European Commission 
on 14 March, and it sets out “how the EU can help to rebuild a peaceful and stable 
Syrian nation and a pluralistic, tolerant civil society in Syria.” It also stresses that the 
EU will assist in the reconstruction of Syria only when a “comprehensive, genuine and 
inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis 
of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is 
firmly under way.” The strategy also reiterates EU’s commitment to the unity, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Syrian state, calls for Syrian-
led and Syrian-owned political transition, reiterates EU support to civil society, and sets 
out the efforts to prepare for reconciliation and transitional justice. (European 
Parliament 2019a.) More detailed analysis of the strategy on how it presents the EU as 
an actor, how it defines reconstruction, and what is the EU vision for the future of Syria, 
will be done in later chapters of this research. 
The EU’s Regional Initiative started properly during 2017, with the acknowledgement 




the regional actors and the world powers under the UN auspices (EEAS 2017m, 2017t). 
The talks with the different regional actors would produce the UN content that can form 
the basis for different issues taken into Geneva talks, including governance, transition 
and reconciliation. (EEAS 2017t, 2017x.) This would require serious political will of all 
actors (EEAS 2017m). 
Besides working with the regional actors, the EU started preparing for the 
reconstruction of Syria. These technical level talks with the UN and international 
financial institutions, such as the World Bank, were seen as building the peace dividend 
(EEAS 2017f, 2017j, 2017m, 2017o, 2017r). The preparations are started under the 
logic that to achieve peace, one needs to start building peace and conditions for it. The 
preparations also include exploration of conditions under which the international 
community can contribute to reconstructing the country. (EEAS 2017h.)  
While exploring the reconstruction proper, the EU was widening its scope of support for 
early recovery, stabilisation, through the aid that goes beyond classical humanitarian 
aid. This included combination of humanitarian and non-humanitarian aid to sectors 
such as early recovery, basic services, health facilities, and helping the life start again. 
(EEAS 2017b, 2017c, 2017d.) Definitions of the line between humanitarian and non-
humanitarian are not made clear, but a look at the EU instruments can give us some 
insight.   
European Neighbourhood Instrument delivers non-humanitarian assistance, which 
targets sectors such as education, support to livelihoods, local governance, health and 
civil society support; Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights support Syrian civil society 
and human rights, defenders; and Development Cooperation Instrument supports 
projects related to food security inside Syria. Under the IcPS there is an EU fund for 
Syria, the EU Syria Peace Process Support Initiative. Regional support instruments 
include Facility for Refugees in Turkey, and Regional Trust Fund in response to the 
Syrian crisis, which supports the neighbouring countries in the region to support Syrian 
refugees.  (European Commission & HR/VP 2017, 5-9.)  
The EU organised the first Brussels conference, “Supporting the future of Syria and the 
region”, in April 2017, and launched the so-called Brussels process that aimed at 




humanitarian support but also political support to push Syrians and other parties 
towards Geneva (EEAS 2017f, 2017t). The conference explored ways to support Syrian 
people to find their way of future, to support the Geneva process, and also what the 
international community can do in the future to support reconstructing the country once 
the political transition is underway (EEAS 2017o). The conference resulted in adopting 
a joint declaration and financial pledges $ 6 billion for 2017 (Council of the European 
Union 2017). 
In the same time, the EU highlighted the complementary tracks as a basis for 
resumption of Geneva process. The different efforts, including the Astana process led 
by Russia, Iran and Turkey, the humanitarian work, as well as the planning of the post-
conflict phase, were recognised as sequencing and coordination (EEAS 2017t). This 
was already recognised in 2016, as the Regional Initiative’s background included the 
acknowledgement that the international actors are already involved in supporting 
different parties of conflict, both local ceasefires and international agreements are 
needed. (EEAS 2016f).   
Coming to 2018, with the Geneva negotiations deadlocked, the EU efforts to push 
actors towards Geneva were amplified. The EU highlighted the limited agreements do 
not work, because of the lack of a broader political agreement of the future of Syria 
(EEAS 2018l). Particular frustration can be read from the comments about the 
reluctance of the Assad government and its allies to meaningfully participate in the 
peace process. For example, Iran and Russia were asked to push for government’s 
participation (EEAS 2018h, 2018k), though in the same time Iran’s negative role in 
supporting Assad was noted (EEAS 2018f), and the intensified military operations 
supported by both Russia and Iran were condemned (EEAS 2018j). The Astana 
guarantors were called to guarantee the ceasefires as their responsibility (EEAS 2018h). 
Thus it seems that the hope for constructive regional and international engagement in 
advancing peace was growing thin.  
Russia also started a new political track on Syria in early 2018 by initiating the Sochi 
meetings. In the same time, the Astana guarantors also reaffirm their support for a 
political settlement based on the UNSC resolution 2254. Another interesting 




a summit between Turkey, Russia, France and Germany was held to discuss the future 
of Syria. (Yacoubian 2019.) 
Another topic emerged as a central issue related to the reconstruction: the return of 
refugees. The EU’s goal of creating conditions for a safe and dignified return was 
highlighted, as was the importance of accountability: “most Syrians do not want to go 
back to a country where there is no accountability” (EEAS 2018c). Thus at the same 
time as the EU prepared the conditions of the return, it was preparing for many refugees 
to stay in Europe and hosting communities (EEAS 2019d). This was also reflected in 
the third Brussels conference, where the support for hosting communities was a key 
topic (EEAS 2019a, 2019c). The return of refugees continued to be an important topic 
in 2019 when the conditions for a safe, voluntary, sustainable and dignified return were 
called after (EEAS 2019d).  
By 2019, the conflict was seen to enter a new phase, where the Assad government 
prevails (EEAS 2019c).  Whereas in 2016, the expectations for Assad and allies’ giving 
in eventually were still up, this is no longer the case. In 2016, the EU did not believe it 
to be in anyone’s interest to destroy the whole country (EEAS 2016d), but after the 
years of the government consolidating its reach over the territory of Syria, through 
military advances, this belief seemed vain. In the same time, the Geneva process has not 
moved forward, which is credited mainly to Assad’s lack of genuine participation and 
continued human rights and humanitarian law violations (EEAS 2019d), which, given 
the strengthening of Assad’s grip on the country, might not be surprising. 
The push for Geneva is still there, and it is presented as the “only just and realistic way 
of ending the conflict” (EEAS 2019c), and the only format that assures international 
legitimacy, the participation of both the government and the opposition and other voices 
from the Syrian society (EEAS 2019b). The Syrian ownership of Geneva is also 
highlighted, as is the EU support for civil society and women (EEAS 2019b, 2019d). 
The unity of the EU in the reconstruction was also mentioned, which could indicate that 
there were doubts about this among other actors (EEAS 2019b). 
From the short timeline description of the EU in the Syrian conflict context, we can see 
two trends: 1) The EU stepping up its role both regionally and internationally through 
the discussion on Syria’s future, using the reconstruction as a leverage over actors 




initial engagement and cooperation with regional powers slowing down with the Assad 
government emerging as the prevailing actor within Syria. 
The reconstruction approach will be analysed in this context of the EU engagement in 
the conflict. In the next chapter, the research framework and methods will be presented, 




4 Research framework 
4.1 Case study of the EU approach  
 
Gerring (2007, 20) defines case study as “the intensive study of a single case where the 
purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a 
population).” Simons (2014, 457) on the other hand, defines it as “an in-depth 
exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular 
project, policy, institution or system in a “real-life” context.” This aim of both 
generalising and particularising allows for the use of both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques in collection and analysis of data or evidence. For Yin (2003, 2) the need for 
case studies also comes from the will to understand complex social phenomena using 
real-life. Thus the value of case studies comes from the in-depth knowledge it can 
produce from a well-defined case using various methods. Simons (2014, 465) notes that 
the process of making inferences with qualitative data in case studies into generalised 
understandings is twofold: to generalise from the case to other cases or to see what in-
depth knowledge can be learned from the uniqueness of the single case itself. This is 
apparent, especially in case studies, that tackle subjects that are not well known or 
researched previously (Gerring 2007, 79). 
This research aims at an in-depth look at the European Union’s approach towards the 
reconstruction of Syria. The research questions are: 
 What is the European Union’s approach to the reconstruction of Syria? 
 What are the dilemmas related to the European Union’s participation in the 
reconstruction of Syria? 
The aim is to describe and explain the case of the reconstruction of Syria in the context 
of the EU’s peacebuilding approach and the EU as an actor in the peacebuilding field. It 
also looks at the statebuilding feature of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction 
and explores the dilemmas that the EU faces in the Syrian case based on both the 
centrality of statebuilding in its approach and its identity as a normative actor.  The 
selection of reconstruction of Syria as a case is also a way of gaining insight on 
dilemmas related to peacebuilding in complex conflicts. Because of this unique nature 
of the case and the limited scope of a Master’s thesis, the analysis does not aim to 




complexity in peacebuilding. This could be called, as Simon (2014, 459) notes, as an 
intrinsic case study, in which the case is studied to learn about itself.  
The single case studies can often emerge out of an empirical puzzle of which the 
researcher may have a hunch about what is happening. The research interests for this 
thesis arose from the researcher’s previous work in an NGO working on peacebuilding 
and Syria, and the prominence of the reconstruction issue among the conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding community during the years 2017-2018. The complexity of the case 
was interesting enough to take a more in-depth look at the case of the reconstruction of 
Syria from the point of view of one of the main actors in the conflict, the EU. The 
systematic analysis of the publicly available documents of the EU about the 
reconstruction of Syria can provide more insights on the case that has not been 
systematically analysed before.  
An interesting broadening of the research scope could be done on both methodological 
and theoretical aspects. Adding interviews of EU officials and other actors linked to the 
reconstruction question as a source of data could widen the understanding of how the 
reconstruction approach has been formulated and how it is understood from within the 
EU. Case studies are also beneficial in that it enables combining different types of 
evidence, such as documents, interviews and observations. However, as the scope of 
this Master’s thesis is limited, only documents are analysed in this study. It could be 
said, that the initial research interest was sparked by observations, but the observations 
do not form evidence in this study.  
4.2 Research data and analysis 
 
The research uses publicly available documents, press releases, joint communications, 
and speeches from foreign policy-relevant European Union bodies: the European 
Council as the main decision-making body, and its diplomatic service, the External 
Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS assists the High Representative in executing their 
mandates, especially regarding conducting the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). (Council 
of the European Union, 2010.) Majority of the press releases and joint communications 
are based on the speeches and remarks of the High Representative/Vice President 
Federica Mogherini in various meetings and their sidelines. The role of the High 




Vice President of the European Commission. Thus she can coordinate and ensure 
coherence in EU foreign policy.  (EEAS 2016p.) Her words can be thus seen as 
representing the EU foreign policy stance towards the issues under consideration, and 
thus analysing them will give insights to the EU’s approach and self-representation. 
The analysis will also include Syria-relevant documents, strategy papers, and 
resolutions from the European Parliament, European Council and the Council of the 
European Union, focusing specifically on those listed in the European Parliament web 
page on the EU Strategy on Syria (European parliament 2019a). These documents are 
included because they form the official framework around the strategy. Even though the 
European Parliament has a limited formal role in foreign policy decision-making, it has 
a degree of informal cooperation with the EEAS. The High Representative is required to 
consult Parliament regularly and inform of the policy’s evolution. (European parliament 
2019b.) In this analysis, Parliament’s resolutions on the situation in Syria and its 
resolution on the EU strategy on Syria are used as well. 
The publicly available documents, such as press releases and news articles about the 
remarks, speeches and meetings of the HR/VP, in addition to strategies and resolutions, 
are part of EU’s strategic communication to other actors, and the general public. They 
can convey messages, clarify policies and stances, and give out general information. As 
the diplomatic arm of the EU, the EEAS is building its image and communicating its 
objectives and identity through publishing documents for all audiences.  
The source material for this thesis is thus twofold: the communication material targeted 
to the broader public published in the EEAS website will provide the basis for the 
analysis of how the official stance towards the reconstruction of Syria, adopted in the 
official strategic documents, is articulated to public audiences. The official strategic 
documents, on the other hand, give the analysis an additional layer to the objectives of 
the reconstruction strategy and the EU strategy in Syria. They will also be used in the 
analysis of how the EU represents itself in the conflict context as well. Thus using the 
documents from the EEAS as a base for the analysis of the EU’s stance towards the 
reconstruction of Syria, is useful in defining firstly, how the EU positions itself as an 
actor in the Syrian conflict, and secondly, how it presents itself as a peacebuilder. 
The official documents were retrieved through the European Parliament website on the 




with a keyword search for both “reconstruction” and “Syria”, giving 59 relevant 
results
6
. The documents start from the year 2016 and continue till March 2019, when 
the third Brussels conference was organised. For analytic clarity, more recent 
documents were not included in the analysis. However, the latest developments in the 
conflict by the time of writing of this thesis (October 2019) are reflected in the 
conclusions section. 
The documents are analysed and interpreted through qualitative content analysis (QCA). 
Content analysis is used when the aim is to extrapolate the message in different kinds of 
documentation. Any kind of means to communicate a message is usable material for 
content analysis. The material is seen to be relating to a specific context, and the texts 
are seen as communication from someone for someone for some purpose. (Mayring 
2014, 39, 43.) Content analysis is not a standardised instrument but needs to be fitted to 
suit the particular objectives of the research or the material used. The analysis is based 
on systematically describing the meanings found in the qualitative material. The 
material is classified or categorised based on either the theoretical framework (concept-
driven) or the data itself (data-driven). This classification can also be called a coding 
frame, which is used to structure the collected materials by focusing on key dimensions 
or categories. (Mayring 2014, 40-41; Schreier 2012, 89.)  
The research framework of this thesis can be found in table 2 on the next page. In this 
research, the categories are based on the research questions and their different 
dimensions. In studying the EU’s approach to the reconstruction of Syria, the main 
question relates to the vision of post-conflict Syria. This vision covers both the 
approach of the EU to peacebuilding and the self-description of EU as an actor: what 
features or principles does the EU push to be part of Syria’s future, and how are these 
features related to the self-description of the EU as an actor itself? 
The research framework consists of three steps. The first step was to form categories of 
analysis based on the theoretical framework of peacebuilding and the EU approach to 
peacebuilding, as well as the normative power perspective as described above. This was 
used to 1) explore what reconstruction means for the EU both via definitions of 
reconstruction, as well as through the vision for post-conflict/post-agreement Syria; 2) 
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what are the preconditions under which it will participate, support, and finance the 
reconstruction of Syria; and 3) how does the EU present itself as a peacebuilder in the 
conflict context. The vision for post-conflict Syria is analysed from the perspective of 
what the EU sees as needed to be (re)constructed. Thus through analysing the vision of 
Syria present in the documents, we can study the EU’s approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
This approach was adopted to describe the full picture of the needs and visions for post-
conflict reconstruction that might not be explicitly visible as direct conceptual 
definitions in the sources. In addition, through studying how the EU presents itself as an 
actor in relation to the Syrian conflict, the research can firstly see what kind of 
principles the EU promotes in the reconstruction of Syria, but also what kind of 
principles it attaches to itself. As noted in the chapter about the normative power 
Europe, the normativity is linked to both what the EU is and how it acts. Thus through 
the analysis, both of these can be connected. Also, the objectives for the EU are 
explored through the framework of normative and strategic goals. 
The second step was more data-driven. The research question and theory-driven 
categories were studied, and the findings were categorised again into subcategories 
based on different themes and patterns that were found in the source materials. These 
subcategories are on defining the reconstruction approach 1) the preconditions of 
reconstruction divided into the action that needs to happen, the principles that need to be 
fulfilled, and the process which has to move forward, so that the EU can participate in 
the reconstruction; and 2) the elements of the vision of Syria’s future, divided into 
political, social and economic factions, as well as into features, issues and principles 
that this vision encompasses. On the EU self-description, these subcategories are 1) 
different roles or identities that the EU presents itself, which were identified to be 
humanitarian, diplomatic and solution-focused; and 2) the objectives, divided into 
normative and strategic.    
As the last step, the findings of subcategories will be reflected in the theoretical 
framework to see similarities and differences. Also, the contradictions and dilemmas 
within the approach and the EU self-description will be explored vis-à-vis the conflict 






Table 1. Research framework 
Theoretical framework Concept-driven Data-driven 





Definition of reconstruction Conceptual definition 
Preconditions for reconstruction Principles  
Actions 
Process 






EU as a normative power Self-description as a 
peacebuilder 












5 Analysis: Defining reconstruction and post-conflict Syria 
 
This section defines the European Union’s approach to the reconstruction of Syria as it 
is presented in the source documents, as well as the way it presents itself in the conflict 
context. It will analyse following helping questions: 
 How is reconstruction defined? 
 What are the preconditions for the EU’s participation in the reconstruction? 
 What is the EU’s vision for post-conflict Syria? 
 How does the EU present itself in the Syrian conflict? 
Direct definitions of reconstruction are scarce throughout the source materials. To get a 
full picture on how the EU defines reconstruction, following steps were taken in the 
research: firstly, to find direct definitions of reconstruction through the adjectives and 
other features that are linked to it; and secondly taking a broader look on what kind of 
vision the EU has of a post-conflict Syria, including political, social and economic 
dimensions. Thirdly, the preconditions for the reconstruction assistance were analysed 
in-depth. Finally, the EU’s self-description was analysed through categorising different 
descriptions of its role in Syria. 
In the documents, reconstruction can be seen as a concept encompassing all aspects of 
rebuilding a state and a nation after a conflict: in 2016, reconstruction is described to be 
physical, political and social (EEAS 2016i), and economic (EEAS 2016j, 2016f), and in 
2017 it is also described as social and human (EEAS 2017j). Sometimes economic 
recovery and reconstruction are linked together (EEAS 2017k), and other times it 
highlighted that reconstruction is not only material but includes rebuilding trust (EEAS 
2017p). From this, we can conclude, that reconstruction is viewed through a holistic 
approach, which encompasses all aspects of life in a state, from the reconstruction of 
political and civic life to reconstructing the economic system, to reconstructing ties and 
relationships between individuals and communities in the state. 
A core document is the EU Strategy for Syria, which consists of the Joint 
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an EU 




Syria (2017). The European Parliament resolution (2017) welcomed the strategy. The 
joint communication (2017) defines the risks and threats to EU core interests, the 
strategic goals, the objectives for Syria, the main lines of action in Syria to implement 
the objectives, as well as the EU engagement in early planning for reconstruction and 
transition.  
The EU strategic goals are said to align with its core interest and values and are built on 
the Global Strategy for the EU’s foreign and security policy, as well as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. These goals are related to the vision that the EU has for Syria: 
unity and integrity, democracy, diversity and inclusivity, security and good governance, 
stability and strong economy. To achieve these goals, the objectives are to end the war 
through a political transition process negotiated by the parties, promoting a meaningful 
and inclusive transition in Syria through strengthening the political opposition and in 
line with UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué, promoting democracy, human 
rights and freedom of speech by strengthening civil society, promoting a national 
reconciliation process including transitional justice and accountability for war crimes, 
saving lives by addressing humanitarian needs, and supporting resilience of Syrian 
people, institutions and society. (European Commission & HR/VP 2017, 7-8.)  
The EU engagement in reconstruction is linked to a political solution to the conflict 
based on UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué. This is presented strongly: the 
EU ”will not be able to assist with the reconstruction of the country until a 
comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition is under way.” Thus the issue 
is not about will, but about ability linked to the fulfilment of certain preconditions. 
(European Commission & HR/VP 2017, 14.) 
Have there been changes in the stance during the years 2016-2019? Are some elements 
more emphasised than others at different times? This is the focus of the next chapter, 







5.1 Preconditions for reconstruction 
 
The vision of post-conflict Syria is linked to the conditionality that the EU sets for its 
participation. This precondition defines part of post-conflict Syria that needs to be 
present before the post-conflict phase and thus is elemental in creating the post-conflict 
Syria according to that vision.  
From the EEAS documents between 2016 and 2019, it is possible to construct the 
following categorisation (see the table on the next page) on the preconditions for 
participating in, supporting or financing reconstruction. In the first column, different 
definitions or descriptions of the precondition are listed. In the second column, different 
definitions of the precondition, or the action that has to happen, are listed. In the last 
one, the process and the required steps are listed. 
 
‘Political transition’ is the defined action in 2016 after the emergence of the 
reconstruction stance. Throughout the year, the transition is the only word used to 
describe what needs to happen in Geneva. In 2017, however, the transition was not the 
only word: ‘political agreement’ (EEAS 2017a, 2017c, 2017d, 2017m, 2017o, 2017p, 
2017q,  2017r) becomes more common than before, and ‘political process’ (EEAS 
2017o) is also used. Coming to 2018, ‘political process’ has become the main action 
(EEAS 2018b, 2018d, 2018f, 2018g, 2018h, 2018k, 2018j), but the transition (EEAS 
2018e, 2018i, 2018o) and the agreement (EEAS 2018l) are still existing on the side. 
There is also a mention of ‘political solution’ (EEAS 2018c), which was also mentioned 
in 2016 (EEAS 2016d). Finally, in 2019, we can see that ‘political process’ is the 










 negotiated between Syrian 
parties 
 based on UNSCR 2254 





 political transition 
 political agreement 
 political process 
 a framework for a 
transitional political 
agreement 
 firmly underway 
 underway 
 found to pave the way to 
the transition 
 will be in place 
 has been reached 
 will start 
 will be reached in Geneva 
 will be agreed in Geneva 
 is reached in Geneva 
under UN auspices 





dominating description (EEAS 2019a, 2019c), with mention on transition (EEAS 
2019d). 
Thus we can see that while in 2016 the ‘political transition’ was the primary way to 
describe what needs to be achieved in Geneva, it gave way to other definitions, the 
‘political agreement’ and the ‘political process’. This could be read as a sign of 
diminishing ambition over the minimum requirement for reconstruction: from direct 
transition to just a process. Perhaps the requirements have stayed more or less the same, 
but the official language was made less confrontational. 
In 2016, the political transition was to ‘have started’ (EEAS 2016b, 2016e, 2016f, 
2016l, 2016m, 2016n) or ‘under way’ (EEAS 2016l,), or even ‘be in place’ (EEAS 
2016h). In 2017, a new expression emerges: that the transition should be ‘firmly under 
way’ (EEAS 2017f, 2017g, 2017j, 2017k, 2017l, 2017o, 2017w, 2017x, 2017y), or the 
political agreement ‘will be in place’ (EEAS 2017r) or ‘has been reached’ (EEAS 
2017a, 2017c, 2017m, 2017o, 2017p). 2018 definition is quite consistent. The political 
process or the political agreement needs to be ‘firmly under way’ (EEAS 2018c, 2018d, 
2018e, 2018f, 2018g, 2018h, 2018j, 2018k).  ‘Reached’ (EEAS 2018l) is mentioned 
only once. In 2019, we can see both consistency and change. The transition should be 
‘firmly under way’ (EEAS 2018d), or there should be ‘some movements in the political 
process’ (EEAS 2019c), or ‘fully under way’ (EEAS 2019a) or ‘will start again’ (EEAS 
2019a). 
Thus the demand for the political transition having begun or underway has stayed 
constant through the years. However, the most significant change has happened in 2017 
and 2018, when the initial demand of the political agreement to be in place of reached in 
2017 changes into being ‘firmly’ underway in 2018. Thus we can perhaps see the 
diminishing importance of ambition in the result of the Geneva process between these 
years. Also when coming to 2019, it seems like the last hopes of fuelling the Geneva 
process are gone: in order to participate in the reconstruction, the political process has to 
move at least some or even start again. The Geneva process has stalled, but the need for 
reconstruction is still there. Does this tell about loosening the preconditions for 
reconstruction? It is not possible to answer this based on the publicly available 




The last layer of the definition of the precondition is the description or definition of the 
action. This means what kind of transition/agreement/process is acceptable. One of the 
key definitions for this comes at the end of 2016: first mention of the transition under 
the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the 2012 Geneva 
Communiqué (EEAS 2016f) is put out. This stays a consistent definition through the 
other years as well (EEAS 2017e, 2017j, 2017k, 2017m; EEAS 2018e, 2018i, 2018o), 
though it is not mentioned as often as maybe would be expected. These documents form 
the basis of the negotiations in Geneva under UN auspices. 
The Geneva Communiqué includes guidelines for the political transition. These include 
that the vision for future Syria has to include all inhabitants; the transition has to have a 
clear timetable, can be implemented without causing further violence, and it is credible. 
It then identifies the clear steps in the transition, which include the establishment of a 
transitional governing body, national dialogue process, review of the constitution and 
legal system, and inclusion of women. The Communiqué also includes a vision for the 
future, based on consultations with Syrians. This includes democracy, pluralism, 
compliance with international standards on human rights, independence of the judiciary, 
accountability of government and the rule of law, and equality of sectarian, ethnic, 
religious, linguistic and other groups within the society. (United Nations A/66/865–
S/2012/522 2012, 3-5.) 
In 2017, there are also other descriptions linked to the process: credible (EEAS 2017a, 
2017c, 2017d, 2017j, 2017k, 2017l, 2017w, 2017x, 2017y) and inclusive (EEAS 2017c, 
2017d, 2017j, 2017l, 2017r, 2017u). Also, the adjectives meaningful and legitimate 
(EEAS 2017j; 2018d), and comprehensive and genuine (EEAS 2018e, 2018i, 2018o) 
start to emerge in 2017 and continue in 2018. Another key definition is that in 2017, the 
emphasis was put on that the political transition is negotiated between Syrian parties 
(EEAS 2017j, 2017k). This was repeated in 2018 as well (EEAS 2018i, 2018o). In 
2018, also the question of legitimacy is taken up, but from the point of view of the 
international community: the political process needs to be ‘legitimate from the 
international point of view’ (EEAS 2018d), and “only a UN-brokered process mandated 
by the UNSCR will be seen by the Syrian people as impartial, with the required 
international legitimacy” (EEAS 2018o). In 2019, no adjectives are used to describe the 




Based on this, we could assume that by 2017, there started to be worries about the 
quality of the Geneva process and the participation or motivation of negotiating parties, 
which would result in the need to highlight the credibility and inclusivity. These doubts 
would strengthen in 2018, when even stronger words like meaningful, legitimate and 
genuine are emphasized: this could indicate that the EU did not trust the negotiating 
parties, or other actors linked to the conflict, to be pushing for the negotiations or sitting 
in the negotiation table, with good intentions on building peace. 
The preconditions listed here form a way of using positive conditionality as introduced 
earlier. The positive conditionality applies to the funds and political will available for 
reconstruction, if the Syrian government genuinely participates in the negotiations on 
political transition in the country, based on the UNSRC 2254 and the Geneva 
Communiqué, and the transition process will be firmly underway. On the other hand, 
besides the positive conditionality seen here, also negative conditionality is used in the 
case of Syria, as there are several sanctions against the government and its affiliates 
imposed by the EU.  
The EU restrictive measures were adopted in January 2012 onwards with the Council 
Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 as amended, together with the Council Decision 
2013/255/CFSP. They aimed to address the “continued brutal repression and violation 
of human rights by the Government of Syria” (European Commission 2017, 2). The 
sanctions include “a ban on internal repression equipment and other export and import 
restrictions, travel restrictions, an asset freeze, a prohibition on participation in certain 
infrastructure projects and investment in such projects, restrictions on the provision of 
financial services, and other restrictions.” The list of persons and entities that are 
subject to restrictive measures includes the Syrian government and its supporters, ones 
that benefit from the government, have part in the chemical weapons attacks, as well as 
senior officers of the Syrian Armed Forces, Syrian security and intelligence services, as 
well as members of Syrian government-affiliated militias (EU Sanctions Map 2019). 
Lifting the restrictive measures is one of the issues that the EU Strategy for Syria (2017) 
lists as possible actions that the EU will do if the preconditions are met. These include 
also resuming bilateral cooperation with the Syrian government and mobilising tools 
under the ENP and other programmes to boost the economy and tackle governance and 




from international donors. The sectors that can fall under this support include security, 
governance reforms and service delivery, social cohesion, peacebuilding and 
reconciliation, human capital, and economic recovery. (European Commission & 
HR/VP 2017, 15-17.) 
The Strategy outlines that the EU will engage and contribute to the exercise conducted 
by the UN Inter-agency Task Force that details the interventions needed to support the 
political process and transitional government structures after a peace agreement. In 
addition to the task force, the EU participates in joint EU-UN damage and needs 
assessments, seeks to integrate parallel efforts of the World Bank, and prepare ground 
for a joint Recovery and Peace Building Assessment between the EU, World Bank and 
the UN, that will focus on longer-term recovery and reconstruction, together with 
transitional government structures. Also the role of the EU in coordinating key donors 
in Syria, including the member states Syria’s neighbouring countries, Arab international 
financial institutions and other parties, is highlighted.  (European Commission & 
HR/VP 2017, 14-15.) 
What more could we know about the EU’s approach to the reconstruction of Syria? 
What kind of political system and institutions would there be to reconstruct, and how 
would they look like after reconstruction? What does the reconstruction of trust and 
social relationships look like? In order to analyse the EU’s approach to the 
reconstruction of Syria, an image of what reconstructed Syria will look like need to be 
constructed. What kind of political system will it have, what needs to be rebuilt between 
people, and what kind of economic system will need to be reconstructed? To answer 
these questions, two types of analysis was conducted: firstly, to assess the EU vision for 
post-conflict Syria, the political, economic and social dimensions of reconstruction were 
analysed in the EEAS materials; and secondly, how the EU presents itself as an actor 
related to the reconstruction was analysed.  
 
5.2 EU vision for post-conflict Syria 
 
Based on the features of post-conflict reconstruction on the theoretical level, the 
following categorisations were formed: political, institutional, social, and economical. 
The political category was further divided into three subcategories: specific policy-




promoted. The social category was also divided into two subcategories: principles and 
issues. The economic category only had one mention in the source material, so it does 
not give many insights.  
What is significant about the EU’s post-conflict vision is that in the EEAS sources, the 
description focuses mainly on the political aspects. Even though in the direct definitions 
of reconstruction, political reconstruction is not mentioned often, but when analysing 
the post-conflict vision of Syria, the political aspect becomes more prominent. Majority 
of the elements of the vision are linked to the reconstruction of political institutions and 
how these institutions link to the relationship between the institutions or the political 
system and the people. The following analysis of the categories will first focus on the 
political category, and then the social category with a focus on reconciliation. The 
categorisation can be seen in the following table format. 
  
Table 3. Features of the EU vision of future Syria 





- the rule of law 
- power-sharing 
- justice 
- pluralistic political system 
- sovereign, independent, 
territorially integrated/united 
- decentralization/ devolution 
- local governance 
 
- legitimacy & accountability of 
government 
- effectiveness 
- functioning institutions 
- accepted by regional actors  
- accountability for war crimes 
- access to documentation for 
housing and property 
- transitional justice 
- space for civil society 
 
- inclusivity 
- protection of minorities 
- diversity 
- unity 
- respect for human rights 
- freedom of speech 
- Syrian-led 
- accountability 
- security and safety 
Social  - reconciliation 
- conditions for the return of  
refugees and IDPs  





- security and safety 
- human rights 
- freedom of speech 
- resilience 




The EU vision for political institutions forms around the notion of democracy and 
modern state institutions. However, democracy does not appear in the sources together 
with reconstruction until 2017. In 2016, it was said that there is a need to focus on post-
conflict system or form of governance (EEAS 2016df), the role for the president of the 
parliament (EEAS 2016d) and the political and institutional future of Syria (EEAS 
2016g). There are also mentions of power-sharing (EEAS 2016d), local governance 
(EEAS 2016j) and decentralisation or devolution (EEAS 2016d, 2016e, 2016f) as 
features of the system. Another focus is on inclusivity and accountability of the political 
system and government (EEAS 2016a, 2016e, 2016f). The participation and protection 
of all Syrians, especially the minorities, is highlighted (EEAS 2016d, 2016e, 2016f) as 
well. 
In addition to the government being accountable and inclusive for Syrians themselves, it 
is also mentioned that the post-conflict solutions need to be acceptable for all regional 
powers and the European Union (EEAS 2016d). This feature also appears in 2017, 
when it is formulated as ‘accompanied by the regional actors’ (EEAS 2017mt). This 
acceptability is linked to the EU effort to talk with the regional actors about the future of 
Syria, and to find a common way to push all actors, Syrian and regional powers alike, 
towards the Geneva negotiations. To fill this goal, the EU started its Regional Initiative. 
This topic will be analysed more in the next chapter about the role of the EU. 
The vision is strengthened in 2017 when it becomes more detailed together with the EU 
strategy for Syria. If in 2016, it was said that the post-conflict Syria needs to define its 
form of government and system, now there are more defined features that are promoted. 
These two features are democratic political system, and justice and accountability. 
There are also notions about the relation of future Syria in the international context. Its 
statehood is highlighted as Syria should be a ‘sovereign, independent, territorially 
integrated and united country’ (EEAS 2017c, 2017g, 2017j, 2017k, 2017l, 2017m). This 
definition follows in later years (EEAS 2018b, 2018c, 2018h, 2018i, 2018o; EEAS 
2019c). 
Democracy is mentioned during 2017 multiple times (EEAS 2017f, 2017g, 2017j, 
2017k, 2017l, 2017m, 2017r, 2017t). Other linked attributes are inclusivity (EEAS 
2017f, 2017m, 2017t, 2017v) and diversity (EEAS 2017p, 2017t), Syrian leadership 




crucial role of civil society (EEAS 2017f). Coming to 2018, similar features are used. 
Democratic system (EEAS 2018b, 2018c, 2018h. 2018i) includes a legitimate 
government, a pluralistic political system, the rule of law and a stable political system 
(EEAS 2018i). The state should also be effective with functioning institutions (EEAS 
2018i), and the future of Syria should be in the hands of Syrians (EEAS 2018b, 2018h). 
Also, inclusivity and protection of ethnic and religious groups are mentioned (EEAS 
2018b, 2018c, 2018h, 2018i). In 2019, democracy is still a feature of the system (EEAS 
2019b, 2019e), as are inclusivity (EEAS 2019b, 2019e), diversity (EEAS 2019b, 
2019c), and the role of civil society (EEAS 2019b). Mogherini notes that “Peace in 
Syria can only be sustainable if it is just, inclusive and democratic.” (EEAS 2019b.) 
Other issues related to the political system and its principles are freedom (EEAS 2017l, 
2017m, 2017t), and human rights and freedom of speech (EEAS 2017r) are mentioned 
as well, and they are a stable part of the vision also later (EEAS 2018i). One key feature 
during 2017 is the emphasis on stabilisation (EEAS 2017b, 2017d, 2017r, 2017t) and 
security and safety (EEAS 2017c, 2017j, 2017t). The emphasis on stabilisation could be 
linked to the Astana process, which was launched in 2017 as well. 
Also, in 2019, the conditions for ‘safe, voluntary, sustainable and dignified return of 
refugees’ (EEAS 2019b, 2019d) is emphasised. This definition of the conditions 
encompasses all aspects of reconstruction: political, social and physical. All these 
features are coming together in the emphasis on the role of Syrians in building their 
future, and the effort the EU is doing to push for the progress in the Geneva 
negotiations. 
“This political work that the European Union has done goes together with 
the continuous support we are giving to the Syrian opposition, to civil 
society organisations – in particular women organisations – in Syria and 
now especially in the framework of the Geneva talks, but also looking 
ahead to enabling them to play a role in the transition and post-transition 
periods, as we believe that all Syrians deserve to take part in the definition 
and construction of their future, for a united, inclusive, and democratic 
Syria where they deserve to live in freedom, diversity, dignity, securely 




A key focus is on transitional justice and accountability for war crimes and violations of 
international humanitarian law or human rights (EEAS 2017f, 2017j, 2017l, 2017o, 
2017p, 2017q, 2017r) and addressing Syrian’s legitimate grievances (EEAS 2017k). 
This is linked to the reconciliation process and the need for transitional justice. In this, 
the social and political levels are ultimately intertwined. It also links to the ability and 
will of refugees to return to their homes: “Reconciliation and transitional justice will 
also be an integral part of rebuilding the country on a peaceful basis.” (EEAS 2017j.) 
The vision of future Syria is linked strongly to this process: 
“Fifth point that is very important to us and to all Member States and that 
was re-stressed today: the need to promote accountability for war crimes 
with a view to facilitating a national reconciliation process and 
transitional justice. This is something on which we believe the future of 
Syria can be based.” (EEAS 2017r.) 
In 2018 and 2019, these features keep quite constant (EEAS 2018c, 2018i; EEAS 
2019b, 2019e), though there is less emphasis on them in the sense of the amounts the 
topic is brought up. However, accountability and justice are a crucial part of the EU 
strategy for Syria, and link to the social dimension of the reconstruction as well:  
“We all know that reconciliation needs justice and you can count on us to 
work on accountability. This is again a European experience, we know 
that reconciliation and peace needs justice.” (EEAS 2019c.) 
Reconciliation emerges in the first source linked to reconstruction (EEAS 2016a) and 
stays a part of the vision consistently throughout the timeframe until 2019
7
. A national 
reconciliation process is also mentioned multiple times (EEAS 2018i, 2018o; EEAS 
2017f).  Reconciliation is raised as the main focus of reconstruction and building 
sustainable peace, as directly illustrated by Mogherini in 2019:  
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“We know that reconciliation and sustainable peace is only possible when 
you rebuild not only the bridges, the highways, the hospitals and the 
schools, but mainly the social fabric of the country. When people look at 
each other not as potential enemies, but as neighbours and friends - not 
necessarily friends because you can live well together with someone even 
if it is not your friend, but you can live alongside each other out of respect 
and on the basis of a common identity.” (EEAS 2019b.) 
Reconciliation is said to be the hardest part of rebuilding societies: “having people 
living together, after having killed each other for so long” (EEAS 2016d).  
In 2016 and 2017, reconciliation is emphasised at the local level (EEAS 2016f; EEAS 
2017t), which links to the importance of the political process and the post-conflict 
reconstruction being Syrian-led. In highlighting the role of Syrian peacebuilders, their 
role is linked to reconciliation as “building the bridges that will then be the basis for 
reconciliation” (EEAS 2019b), and as “the people who can reach across the conflict 
lines, talk to each other, heal the wounds over six years of war, make reconciliation 
truly possible on the ground, locally” (EEAS 2017f). Reconciliation is linked to 
“restoring the fabric of the Syrian society”, and the role of women and civil society is 
emphasised (EEAS 2019c).  
Reconciliation is linked in 2017 and 2018 to the accountability for war crimes and 
transitional justice (EEAS 2018i; EEAS 2017r). The European experience also serves as 
a base for the argument that peace and reconciliation need justice (EEAS 2019b), which 
makes reconciliation one of the areas where the European Union would have specific 
added value. (EEAS 2016k; EEAS 2017t.) 
Thus in order to rebuild the social fabric of Syria, there is a need for a political process 
of transitional justice that will then serve as the basis for reconciliation between people. 
On the other hand, the reconciliation process is part of the political track, which is the 





“--- "In the European Union we believe that we cannot abandon the 
political track," she said."Only a political transition, only a political 
solution, only a reconciliation process, only a power-sharing mechanism 
will allow us to work on the reconstruction of the country."” (EEAS 
2016d.)  
Reconstruction is also seen as “a powerful tool to facilitate reconciliation” (EEAS 
2017d). Thus reconciliation is not only seen as a post-conflict event, but it is also a 
requirement for the political agreement: reconciling between the conflict parties in 
Geneva is a starting point for a society-wide reconciliation in the local level.  
Given that reconciliation is the focus of rebuilding the Syrian society, also other issues 
and principles are part of social reconstruction. In 2016, also the issue of the return of 
refugees and IDPs is taken up (EEAS 2016n), but this issue drops for 2017, and 
becomes a topic again later in 2018 and 2019, when the discussion turns to the 
conditions for “safe, voluntary, sustainable and dignified return of refugees” (EEAS 
2019b, 2019d).  
In 2017, more principles were related to the future of Syrian society. These include an 
emphasis on the future and the way there belonging to the Syrians (EEAS 2017t), the 
need for the whole society, including minorities, being part of the future. The minorities 
are also seen as needing special protection within society. Thus the diversity of the 
Syrian population needs to be recognised in any form of future state. (EEAS 2017t, 
2017m, 2017f, 2017l, 2017p.) These principles, inclusion, diversity and protection of 
ethnic and religious groups, are the critical elements of social reconstruction of the 
country also in 2018 and 2019 (EEAS 2018b, 2018c, 2018i, 2018h, 2018o; EEAS 
2019b, 2019e) 
There is also a need to build the resilience of the population (EEAS 2017r). Other 
features belonging to the people are also freedom (EEAS 2017l, 2017m, 2017t), and 
security and safety (EEAST 2017c, 2017j, 2017t). Respect for human rights and 
freedom of speech should also be significant parts of Syria’s future (EEAS 2017r). 
Human rights are also discussed in relation to the political reconstruction of the country 




If these are the features that the EU sees necessary in the future of Syria, how is it ready 
to assist in reconstructing them? The EU Strategy for Syria (2017) defines sectors that 
the EU could provide support. The social cohesion, peacebuilding and reconciliation 
sector includes support for local-level reconciliation processes, transitional authorities, 
as well as preparing and supporting the return of refugees. In longer-term, a rights-based 
and victim-centred transitional justice mechanism, national dialogue and profound 
judicial reform, are part of what the EU could play a role.( European Commission & 
HR/VP 2017, 16-17.) 
From the political perspective, in the governance, reforms and service delivery sector, 
the EU support is said to be twofold: in the immediate post-agreement phase, the EU 
could restore basic service delivery at the local level (education, health, water, 
electricity, rubble removal, waste management, etc.). In the longer-term, the EU could 
support the post-conflict reform of state institutions, including unifying the governance 
system and reinforcing coherence and support the drafting of a new constitution and the 
organisation of elections. (European Commission & HR/VP 2017, 16.) In other words, 
strengthening the state institutions and their ability to govern the whole of Syria. 
Support to state and local institutions would contribute to ”reinforcing the legitimacy of 
reformed and accountable state and local institutions” (ibid.). This aspect is one of the 
key dilemmas in the reconstruction approach at the moment, as will be argued in the 
following chapters. 
Lastly, the economic sector was not very detailed in the EEAS sources, but in the EU 
Strategy (2017), it forms one of the sectors. EU support to economic sector includes in 
the immediate post-agreement phase, increased livelihoods support, and in the longer-
term, complete re-launch of the Syrian economy. This re-launch would need 
coordinated support from the international community, but the EU macro-financial 
assistance would be tied into the presence of an IMF programme and the preconditions 
such as respect for democratic mechanisms, including a multiparty parliamentary 
system, the rule of law and respect for human rights. (European Commission & HR/VP 
2017, 17.) Thus the EU economic support is tied to a major reform in the whole 
governance system of Syria, as well as the presence of international institutions. This 




The overall key features of the reconstruction of Syria, based on the analysis, include a 
significant focus on the institutional level: constructing a democratic inclusive political 
system that takes into account and protects the rights of people and especially the 
minorities. In addition, transitional justice system needs to guarantee accountability for 
war crimes and violations of human rights. From the social side, reconciliation, which is 
linked to transitional justice, is raised as a key feature of reconstructing the social fabric 
of Syria. This reconciliation is dependent on inclusion and local ownership, especially 
of civil society and women. An interesting feature is also that the new political order or 
solution needs to be acceptable also for external actors, including regional and 
international actors.  
However, how does the EU legitimate this vision and the potential actions it is willing 
to take if the preconditions are met? What are the EU’s motivations for participating in 
the reconstruction? This is the topic of the next chapter. 
 
5.3 EU in Syria: roles and motivations 
 
This section will analyse what kind of image the EU gives of itself and its role in the 
context of the reconstruction of Syria. The roles were classified partially based on the 
analysis of the source materials, and partially in the normative power Europe theoretical 
base presented above. 
In the normative power Europe, the EU would be expected to highlight its role as a 
humanitarian actor (Whitman 2013, 182), the European experience as a peace project, 
as well as emphasise non-violent means to end conflicts. Based on the source materials, 
the roles the EU presents of itself were divided into five different roles: Humanitarian, 
Value-based, Diplomatic, Experienced, and Solution-focused. These categories were 
seen to encompass the image of the EU and its role in the conflict and relation to the 
other actors. 
The humanitarian role is based on the role of the EU as the leading humanitarian actor 
in the conflict. In the same time, it highlights the non-military role the EU has in the 
conflict compared to other actors. It also highlights the support the EU gives to civilians 
in both humanitarian and non-humanitarian forms, and the importance of including 




core values of respect for human rights and relieving suffering. It aims to bring a 
peaceful solution to the conflict and highlights its role as a non-military actor in Syria. 
However, it is emphasised that this position does not mean naïveté, as some actors have 
suggested. 
The diplomatic role emphasises how the EU serves as a mediator and convening actor, 
that can keep good relations with all the actors around the conflict. It also includes the 
EU’s belief in the power of multilateralism and working with states, international 
organisations and NGOs alike. The EU is also presented as a trusted and credible actor 
in the eyes of all other actors. The diplomatic role is supported by the experienced role, 
which could be its subcategory. The Experienced role is based on the ‘European 
experience’ of the integration seen as a peace project, which gives the EU credibility in 
proposing a peaceful solution to the conflict instead of a military one, and provides the 
EU with added value when it comes to rebuilding social structures of the state through 
reconciliation, justice and governance. 
The value-based role could be a cross-cutting category of all the roles, since the 
humanitarian role is backed by values such as respect for human rights, and the 
diplomatic role is backed by the European experience that supports the argument that 
the EU knows better than others that there is no military solution. The value-based role 
highlight that the EU’s actions are based on key values and principles. It also 
emphasises that even though the EU believes in hope and non-military solutions, it is 
not naïve. For the clarity of description, in the following analysis the diplomatic role 
encompasses also experienced and value-based roles. 
Lastly, the solution-focused role paints a picture of the EU as a hands-on solution-
focused actor that actively tries to find solutions, even when others might consider that 
there is no way forward. The EU also is prepared to take further steps when the political 
process moves forward, actively exploring the ways even when the situation is not in 
place yet. The solution-focused EU emphasises practicality and the need to move 
forward in principled manner. It has positive leverage over reconstruction (EEAS 2016j) 






5.3.1 Humanitarian EU 
 
The leading humanitarian role is emphasised in many occasions (EEAS 2016c, 2016d. 
2016e, 2016f; EEAS 2019a, 2019c), as is that the EU is not a party in the conflict or a 
military player on the ground (EEAS 2016d, 2016f). It is also part of the EU strategy for 
Syria (European Commission & HR/VP 2017, 4), where the position of the EU as the 
largest donor is highlighted. In 2017, this position was used to backbone the political 
role of the EU (EEAS 2017f). Also, in 2018, the EU role of not being a military actor on 
the ground is important (EEAS 2018h). Contrasting this position vis-à-vis the other 
actors on the ground, the EU highlights its role as supporting civilians instead of 
bombing the country (EEAS 2017f, 2017p, 2017t). In her remarks to the European 
Parliament in 2016, Mogherini links the humanitarian work and creating political space: 
“I can only ask you, this Parliament, to keep supporting, as you have done 
constantly this year, our work on humanitarian grounds for creating the 
political space for peace in Syria and for all the people of Syria, to benefit 
from a brighter future in their country.” (EEAS 2016f.) 
The support to the civilian population is a key element in the Humanitarian role: the 
EU’s focus is on saving people, building civil society and supporting the political 
process, not military or power-related goals. Syrian ownership of the peace process is 
highlighted, and the EU role is to support and assist the Syrians, but not making 
decisions for them. (EEAS 2017a, 2017f, 2017p, 2017t.) This is also expressed as that 
the EU is on Syrians’ side (EEAS 2017p, 2017t), has been on the side of the civilian 
population throughout the war (EEAS 2017f), and supports the future of Syria, where 
there are Syrians left (EEAS 2017f, 2017s, 2017o). In 2019, the civil society role in the 
peace talks is raised: not only military actors should be present (EEAS 2019b).  
The leading humanitarian role is the basis for sustained engagement with a long-term 
perspective, and it is presented as the priority for the EU (EEAS 2017b, 2017d, 2017f, 
2017o, 2017p, 2017r, 2017s, 2017t). The humanitarian assistance is also unconditional. 
This support for Syrians is also targeted at supporting the resilience of Syrians, 
including the IDPs and refugees (EEAS 2018i). The continued humanitarian support 




said to be clear about its positions so that people know where the EU stands (EEAS 
2018h). 
Long-term engagement, unconditional humanitarian support, focus on civilians, and 
their importance is a key element in the EU’s role as a humanitarian actor. This role has 
an air of neutrality of sorts, being driven by the values of humanitarianism instead of 
will for control and power, as the other actors are sometimes presented to do. The basis 
for these actions is the role of EU as a defender of human rights (EEAS 2017u) and 
standing firmly for accountability (EEAS 2018h). The EU also believes in common 
humanity (EEAS 2019b). 
This role as a trusted actor, that is consistent in their actions and not operating in 
contradictory ways, is well phrased in the following quote: 
“I would finish by saying that the European Union is perfectly positioned 
to play this role, as I said, not only from a humanitarian but also from a 
political perspective. We are, for Syrians and in the region, a credible, 
reliable, trusted partner, first of all able to work with all the different 
regional players equally, and also with a humanitarian presence on the 
ground that can constitute a fruitful starting point to help local 
reconciliation processes, being a humanitarian player who has helped and 
not bombed the country – if I can be a little bit blunt.” (EEAS 2017t.) 
 
5.3.2 Diplomatic EU 
 
The Diplomatic EU is a central actor that can work with everybody, including regional 
powers, international powers, NGOs and the UN (EEAS 2016d, 2016f). It can convene 
different actors to support the Geneva process, including actors that generally do not sit 
at the same table, which is one of the most essential powers the EU is said to have 
(EEAS 2019a; EEAS 2018e, 2018g, 2018h, 2018l; EEAS 2017c). This power also 
requires trust: the EU is trusted by everybody (EEAS 2016f). 
This role of a trusted, credible actor stems from keeping the promises and delivering 
what is pledged (EEAS 2017m; EEAS 2018c, 2018h). Consistency in delivering is 
mentioned as the key element of its credibility: delivery is monitored, there are no 




(EEAS 2018h, 2018k, 2018j). Also, the support for Syrians and the way of supporting 
them and not acting instead of them is highlighted (EEAS 2018d, 2018b). Thus the EU 
is trusted by conflict parties (EEAS 2017f, 2017m, 2017t), by crisis countries and their 
neighbours (EEAS 2017u; EEAS 2019c), and can be a reliable partner for both Syrians 
and the region’s economic development and stability (EEAS 2019a, 2019c). The EU 
can also work at the same level and equally with actors that are opposing each other in 
many ways: Tehran, Riyadh, Ankara and Beirut (EEAS 2017t). The EU has both a 
diplomatic and political role in the conflict, to bring together these different actors and 
to find common ground (EEAS 2018h; EEAS 2017t).  
Besides having good relations with the conflict parties, regional actors and other linked 
actors, the EU relies on its critical supporting role to the Geneva process and its special 
relation to the UN (EEAS 2016d). The EU recognises the value of multilateralism 
(EEAS 2017i, 2017t; EEAS 2018g, 2018l), and is “strong, possibly the strongest, 
supporter of the UN system” (EEAS 2017i). It is said that the EU has full engagement in 
supporting the UN work in Geneva, (EEAS 2017p, 2017r; EEAS 2018c, 2018i), and is 
consistently behind the process (EEAS 2018j, 2018k). 
The diplomatic role is based on the belief that diplomacy works and can deliver results 
(EEAS 2017w), and that disagreements can be addressed through dialogue and political 
talks (EEAS 2018f, 2018h). Thus engagement, cooperation, and finding common 
ground are the keys to a way forward (EEAS 2018h; EEAS 2019e). The EU highlights 
diplomatic and political level when situation gets worse (EEAS 2018h) instead of 
military solutions. 
It is also noted, that it is a “collective duty and responsibility as countries and regional 
organisations to support peace and reconciliation” (EEAS 2019c), which suggests that 
the EU is doing its duty, which cannot be said of all other actors. As a response to other 
non-named actors, it is emphasized many times, that these beliefs in non-military 
solutions and the role of civil society, are not the same as being naïve or idealistic about 
the difficulty of ending the war and getting to a negotiated solution in Geneva (EEAS 
2019b; EEAS 2018l; EEAS 2017p). This is called “our way of foreign policy”, which 
includes not fighting and bombing, but focusing on humanitarian aid, supporting the 
UN process, and being ready to help Syrians build the future of their country by 




“We Europeans are not the ones who are bombing, we are not the ones 
who are fighting, we are not the ones who are pushing for one side or the 
other – we are the ones delivering humanitarian aid, helping the UN to 
reach an agreement and a political solution, and we are the ones getting 
ready to help the Syrians build by themselves, as they would like to do, the 
future of their country. This is our approach; this is the way we believe 
foreign policy should be done, and we are consistent on that. But this does 
not mean that somebody breaks everything and then we pay the bill – this 
is simply not going to happen.” (EEAS 2017p.) 
The belief in dialogue and political talks in solving the crisis is also based on the so-
called “European experience”, which has brought the EU the ability to “understand 
better than others that there is no military solution” (EEAS 2016f). The experience has 
led to lessons learned that while one can win the war in military means, but one can still 
lose the peace. Violence leads to protracted confusion, tension, insecurity and further 
conflict. (EEAS 2017p.) It is also said that no military strategy can substitute a true 
political solution (EEAS 2017j). What is needed after years of war is reconciliation and 
sustainable peace through rebuilding social fabric of the country, is a common identity, 
and ensuring justice (EEAS 2019b). This emphasis on the European experience reflects 
the idea mentioned in the theoretical analysis on the EU’s peacebuilding approach, that 
the EU sees itself as an exemplar on peacebuilding (Duke & Courtier 2010, 26). 
 
5.3.3 Solution-focused EU 
 
In 2017, the EU’s solution-focused role was tied to “doing our part” through all possible 
channels, and complementary work, including engaging with all regional actors, 
international powers, finding common ground. The complementary channels are used to 
push Syrians and leading actors towards the Geneva process. (EEAS 2017m, 2017t). 
However, this eagerness is balanced with a strong message towards actors engaged with 
the conflict: the EU “will not take the bill regardless of any kind of political dynamic --- 
somebody breaks everything, and we pay the bill – not going to happen” (EEAS 2017p). 
EU’s constructive role vis-à-vis these actors is highlighted: “We are the ones building 
solutions: humanitarian, political, economic, social solutions” (EEAS 2017d). In the 
EU strategy for Syria, the responsibility of other actors, those who fuelled the conflict, 




those external actors who have fuelled the conflict”. (European Commission & HR/VP 
2017, 14; Council of the European Union 2017, 7.)  
In 2018, this role is not so much emphasised, but the EU’s role as the solution-seeker is 
still there: the EU is said to bridge the gaps: 
“We always try to help, you know that the European Union always tries to 
bridge the gaps. We have very clear positions. People around the world 
know very well where we stand---“ (EEAS 2018h) 
This would indicate that the EU is working on the complementary channels to fill up the 
gaps left by the Geneva process and other processes such as the Astana process. In 
2019, EU’s readiness to support the reconstruction is the only mentioned part in the 
solution-focused role: it is preparing for mobilising financing of reconstruction with the 
World Bank (EEAS 2019a). However, these funds are, of course, tied to the Geneva 
process. 
Thus the solution-focused role emphasises the EU’s role in comparison with other 
actors as more principled, having long-term perspective, looking to make the process go 
forward in a constructive way. This way, the EU is an actor that puts in efforts, but on 
the other hand, will not accept to do other actors’ parts without its objectives being 










The European Union’s approach to reconstruction can be seen to consist of the 
following elements: strict conditionality, promotion of good governance, and emphasis 
on Syrian ownership and reconciliation.  
The main feature is using strong conditionality to leverage reconstruction assistance in 
favour of the political process. The preconditions include credibility, inclusivity, 
legitimacy and meaningfulness of the political agreement negotiated between the Syrian 
parties, based on the UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué. It was found that the 
preconditions stay consistent during the period under analysis, but with some variation 
in the use of terms political transition, agreement, and process, as well as whether the 
process or the agreement has to be reached or be under way. The trend found in the 
sources is that in the early years the preconditions were presented tighter, whereas 
coming to 2018 and 2019, the terms became looser. This could reflect recalculating the 
ambitions for the process, which started to become deadlocked.  
The preconditions for reconstruction, combined with the sanctions targeted at the Assad 
regime, represent strong conditionality for EU participation. This contrasts with the EU 
practices before, such as the reluctance to use conditionality in cases such as Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Moldova, Arab-Israeli conflict and Cyprus, as Whitman and Wolff 
(2012, 215) noted earlier. However, when comparing cases, the different features of 
targets of restrictions and the conflict context should be taken into account. 
The vision for reconstruction stays the same throughout the analysis. The vision can be 
divided into two main focuses: a total reform of state institutions, producing a 
democratic, inclusive system of governance and justice; and a reconciliation that 
includes transitional justice. A cross-cutting issue for both of these is the respect for 
individual and collective rights and the inclusion of all Syrians in the future and peace 
of their country.  
To drive these objectives, the EU legitimises its role through its humanitarian, 
diplomatic and solution-focused roles. The basic argument is that the EU’s approach is 




solve the conflict. The EU can serve as a trusted, legitimate and neutral partner that can 
bring all partners, also those who usually do not speak to each other, together to push 
for a peaceful solution. The EU’s prestige also stems from its own experience of 
building peace in the European continent through the integration project, which makes 
the EU better positioned to understand that violence is not the solution. Thus the EU is 
supporting Syrians through providing humanitarian aid and pushing for the political 
process to move forward. 
As Whitman (2013) noted, the normative power emphasises non-military, economic, 
social and humanitarian instruments, as well as addressing structural causes and violent 
symptoms of conflicts. The EU’s approach fits into this quite well. Firstly, the EU’s 
humanitarian approach is highlighted as a motivator for the EU participation and as a 
duty. Thus the EU is acting on the base of human security and reducing effects of 
violence through the aid. Secondly, the EU has a great emphasis on the social 
reconstruction of Syria, with a focus on supporting civil society and the role of Syrians 
in the political process and reconstruction. This emphasis relies largely on highlighting 
individual and collective rights, as well as principles such as inclusion, diversity, 
democracy and reconciliation. Thirdly, the EU’s approach to the reconstruction of Syria 
relies largely on economic instruments, as the reconstruction assistance, both expertise 
and financial support, is tied to the precondition of the political process. Thus the 
positive conditionality of granting financial benefits, combined with the negative 
conditionalities of restrictive measures targeted at the Syrian government, push for the 
political process. The EU is using its economic power to push for its objectives. In the 
same time, it firmly declares its vision for post-conflict Syria and the issues which it is 
willing to contribute. Thus, on the other hand, we can see that the approach that the EU 
has for the reconstruction, uses economic power in promotion of normative objectives.  
In the normative principles that the EU promotes in its policy on the reconstruction of 
Syria, we can find all the elements that Manners (2007) listed: sustainable peace, social 
freedom, consensual democracy, individual and collective human rights, the rule of law, 
inclusive equality, social solidarity and good governance.  This emphasis on individual 
and collective rights is in the eyes Richmond, Björkdahl & Kappler (2011, 464) a 




However, we can see many features of statebuilding in the EU’s approach. The focus on 
political institutions, democratic system and norms, the rule of law, accountability and 
good governance are features of the statebuilding as well. Overall the EU’s vision for 
political reconstruction requires a drastic change of the current political and economic 
system of the Syrian state. This is also reflected in the preconditions that the EU sets for 
the reconstruction in the first place.  
In the short timeline of the EU’s engagement with the conflict, two trends were found: 
firstly, the EU stepping up its role as a regional actor, and secondly, a change in the 
context which stalled the Geneva process and brought the conflict into a new phase with 
Assad as the prevailing in power within Syria. Regardless of these trends, the EU stays 
consistent with its messages about its role, the values and principles behind its action, 
and its objectives. The Humanitarian role seems to form the rationale of pushing for the 
Diplomatic role during 2017 and 2018, and when the Geneva process seems to be 
stalling, the Diplomatic and Solution-focused roles are emphasised, with the 
Humanitarian role providing background legitimation. 
The roles found in the analysis reflect well the idea of the normative power Europe. 
Firstly, the background for the EU role is the externalisation of its self-perception and 
using the history of European integration as a peace project. This forms a strong 
legitimator and motivator for the EU approach and the role in the conflict. Secondly, the 
self-description of the EU is quite focused on normative elements.The EU is presented 
to be acting based on respect for human rights, responsibility to support peace and 
reconciliation, and through certain neutrality whose focus is on supporting Syrians 
themselves to solve the conflict, with the EU as an enabler and supporter. In the same 
time, in this supporter role, the EU promotes the inclusion of minorities and 
disadvantaged groups to the negotiations, as well emphasises the civil society role. Thus 
the EU is not an actor motivated by interests related to military or economic power, but 
the welfare and inclusion of Syrian people. Promoting these values as ends themselves 
is a key element in the normative power self-image, as Tocci (2007) noted in earlier 
analysis. However, as suggested above by Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009, 9-10), 
peacebuilding can be motivated by both humanitarian and strategic reasons, with the 





The EU strategy for Syria (European Commission & HR/VP 2017, 2) define the 
following aims for the strategy: ”to define how the EU can play a bigger role in 
contributing to a lasting political solution in Syria under the existing UN-agreed 
framework and help build stability and support post-agreement reconstruction once a 
credible political transition is underway.”. It also defines the alternatives for the 
negotiated political transition: continued conflict or continued autocratic rule, which are 
said to be against the interests of the EU, as well as the Syrian people and the region. 
(ibid., 6.) The repercussions of the continued conflict are listed as continued human 
suffering which would lead to further population displacement especially towards the 
region and Europe, spread of violent extremism, spread of criminal activities, continued 
economic decline, entrenchment of sectarian differences, increased instability in 
neighbouring countries, and further destruction of cultural heritage (ibid., 6-7.) Of these 
issues, many are related to the security of Europe, such as the spread of extremism and 
crime, increased instability in the region, as well as migration flows. More normative 
threats include threats to human welfare in Syria and the region, as well as threats to 
cultural heritage. The EU strategic goals are said to align with its core interest and 
values and are built on the Global Strategy for the EU’s foreign and security policy, as 
well as the European Neighbourhood Policy. These goals are related to the vision that 
the EU has for Syria: unity and integrity, democracy, diversity and inclusivity, security 
and good governance, stability and strong economy. 
For other kinds of interests and objectives, the role of the EU as a regional power was 
highlighted in 2016 through geographical imperative: Europe and the Middle East share 
the same sea, and Europe cannot afford “having a black hole there” (EEAS 2016d). 
Syria and the neighbouring hosting countries like Lebanon and Jordan are presented on 
the verge of exploding and causing more problems (EEAS 2016d). Thus the objectives 
are linked strongly to the security context of the EU, with the aim of stabilisation of the 
region. The geographical connection is also present in 2019. However, instead of 
emphasising the threats to the shared security, the interconnectedness in peace, security 
and economic growth is raised as a motivator for peace. The future is also painted more 
optimistic: the future of power struggles or conflict is not inevitable if there is 
cooperation. (EEAS 2019e.) On the other hand, both political and humanitarian goals 




Preference for some kind of power-sharing solution and possible a decentralised system 
can be seen. On the other hand, the protection of minorities seems to be emphasised, as 
well as their role in a diverse society. These are the two main conflict resolution 
solutions that Tocci (2007, 8) lists, which were mentioned in chapter 3.1.1.  Thus we 
can see that besides the normative objectives, there are also more strategic and security-
linked motives for the EU role. However, in the sources, the normative objectives are 
more emphasised and used for legitimating and motivating the EU role. 
As presented above, the strong conditionality is a step away from the EU’s traditional 
approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction. However, emphasis on normative 
elements follows the general normative power model of the EU’s external relations. 
This combination poses several challenges to the EU as it tries to push for a peacefully 
negotiated solution. The main challenge is the Assad government itself. If there is no 
political transition, the EU’s main leverage for reconstruction does not work, and it will 
not be able to achieve its objectives. This dilemma and others will be analysed next. 
 
6.2 European Union and Syria: reconstruction dilemmas 
 
The EU’s approach reflects on the dilemmas of peacebuilding: the political solution is 
emphasised to be Syrian-led and Syrian-owned, but in the same time in the name of 
sustainability of peace, it has to be acceptable for the regional powers and the 
international community. This is an inherent contradiction that reflects both the 
dilemma of long-term and short-term goals as well as the bottom-up or top-down 
approach of peacebuilding: sometimes long-term needs can make building peace in 
short-term more difficult. The short-term goal being a negotiated solution between the 
Syrian parties, while the long-term peace requires regional agreement as well, and the 
region is as divided as ever in its relationship to the Assad government, but also to the 
different options for the future. On the other hand, including all the levels of conflict 
promotes more holistic approach to the conflict and the realisation, that even though in 
ideal case the peace would be settled by the Syrian parties, the conflict reality is much 
more complex with regional and international actors present on the ground supporting 




Key challenges are related to the statebuilding aspects of pushing for a full reform of the 
state institutions. In the following, it will be argued, that contrary to the basic 
statebuilding approaches which assume that the state structures collapse during the 
conflict, the case of Syria has proven otherwise. This forms a great contradiction 
between the approach and conflict reality.  
The EU cannot support Assad government in reconstruction without giving it certain 
legitimacy, and this cannot be done. This was also illustrated in (EEAS 2019d): “We 
will not grant legitimacy to the current regime or its return into the international arena 
without progress in Geneva and without changes on the ground in relation to respect to 
basic human rights and humanitarian laws” and: “ "Even for pragmatic reasons," she 
[Mogherini] added. "Who do you give the money to? Is it realistic to think that any 
international institution gives the money to Assad?” ” (EEAS 2018g.) A quote from 
Heydemann (2017) illustrates this well: 
“Western support for reconstruction will only legitimize a murderous 
dictatorship, deepen entrenched systems of corruption and criminality, 
and undermine opportunities to address the grievances that drove millions 
of Syrians into the streets in 2011 demanding political and economic 
change.”  
Thus the EU’s approach to reconstruction that focuses on statebuilding and normative 
issues clashes with the conflict realities of Assad prevalence and the resilience of the 
government’s hold over institutions and structures of the country.  The features of the 
government’s continuing control over the Syrian economy and institutions through 
clientelist networks form a major challenge to the reconstruction approaches. 
Heydemann categorises Syria as a ‘fierce’ state instead of a fragile state, as instead of 
dysfunctional institutions and poor governance, the institutions are designed to support 
the survival of the ruling elite. These kinds of states are built on social base, a network 
of compliance and incentives of transactional loyalty. According to him, this has 
implications for the reconstruction policies and practices that are often based on fragility 
and state failure. Such an approach would underestimate the resilience of institutions, 
norms and practices of Assad’s economic governance in Syria. Thus the continuity of 
governance practices is for Heydemann a defining feature in the Syrian case. The 




assumptions of current approaches to reconstruction based on fostering the development 
of post-conflict institutions. (Heydemann 2018a, 49; Heydemann 2018b, 1-2, 4-5.)  
Heydemann also says that “the continuity of prewar practices affects the relationship 
between sovereignty, governance and conflict resolution”, as in the context of the Arab 
Middle East, many conflicts are framed as stemming from the failed nation-building 
based on artificial state boundaries. Some solutions that have been proposed are, in fact, 
redefining sovereignty through different forms of decentralisation, federalism, local 
autonomy, or even state partition. However, according to Heydemann, the civil wars in 
the Middle East have weaponised sovereignty into rigid, unitary, centralised and 
indivisible definition. International recognition for sovereignty can thus improve one 
side’s advantages in military success and weaken their incentives to negotiate. 
(Heydemann 2018a, 49-50.) We can see this dynamic with the Syrian government’s 
sovereignty being strengthened by its international allies Russia and Iran, which has 
contributed to the military successes of the government and its reluctance to participate 
in the negotiations under the UN auspices in Geneva. 
The reason why the reconstruction is such a dilemma for the EU is because the 
statebuilding approach and strong conditionality clashes with the Assad government’s 
resilience, but on the other hand, the strong humanitarian focus and legitimation for the 
EU’s role in the conflict would push the EU to relieve human suffering and support an 
environment for longer-term development in the country, as well as in the neighbouring 
countries. Because the EU cannot support the Assad government, it is limited in 
possibilities of action to support individual human lives. Statebuilding approach’s aim 
of strengthening the government’s capacity to reconstruct both its institutions and the 
country more widely contradicts EU’s objective of getting rid of the current political 
structures. In other words, the question is about how to help Syrians rebuild without 
strengthening the system against which many of the people rose in 2011, and how to 
reconstruct without legitimating Assad. This could lead to strengthening the conflict 
drivers that led to the conflict in the first place.  
Richmond, Björkdagl & Kappler’s (2011) statement that the normative approach of the 
EU, with the emphasis on rights and needs of people in social and cultural contexts, 
might be less capable to respond to ‘hard power’ issues, is a very central one in the case 




economic and diplomatic power, the leverage the EU had hoped to tip the scale towards 
political transition has not worked. This can represent a significant blow to the 
approach.  
In using conditionality, the EU has run into two challenges. Firstly, the sanctions are 
affecting the Syrian population more than they are affecting the Assad government. The 
EU’s Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures state that the “Sanctions 
should be targeted in a way that has maximum impact on those whose behaviour we 
want to influence. Targeting should reduce to the maximum extent possible any adverse 
humanitarian effects or unintended consequences for persons not targeted or 
neighbouring countries.” (European Commission 2017, 2.) However, for example, as 
the health sector has been already under pressure due to violence and deliberate attacks 
that target health facilities, the sanctions have also affected the access to health care, 
medicines and other essentials (e.g. Al Faisal & Alsaleh 2012). The humanitarian aid 
sector has also suffered from the sanctions, as some of the dual-use products, which 
require special clearances to be exported, may be needed for relief operations. Process 
of obtaining licences can be too hard, slow and costly for many humanitarian actors. 
These dual-use items include for example agricultural fertiliser, certain drilling tools 
and pipes, chlorine products used for water purification and sanitation, and power 
generators. (see, e.g. Lund 2019.)   
Secondly, the Assad government is not interested in receiving European money in the 
first place, but holds its allies Russia and Iran, and potentially China, to come for its aid. 
However, neither Russia nor Iran has the capacity to cover the costs of reconstruction, 
as was argued earlier. It will also be left to be seen how much the Gulf states will be 
interested in investing in the country. There have been some signs of rapprochement 
between the Gulf states and Syrian government, for example at the end of 2018 there 
was discussion on readmitting Syria to the Arab League (see, e.g. Macaron 2018; 
McKernan & Chulov 2018).  
Samaha (2019) raises several counter-productive effects that the EU’s sanctions can 
have on the political level. The first is that the government that has gotten used to 
sanctions since 1980s has developed resilience structures that protect it from the main 
effects. Through the control of patronage networks, shortages will help to solidify 




sanctions to blame the economic problems to external actors. Secondly, the sanctions 
”criminalise the Syrian government as a whole, and consequently those who do any 
work in government-held territories”, which leaves very little space for the economy to 
operate. This hurts the population widely. (ibid.) 
Thus the contradiction is that while imposing the sanctions on the regime that does not 
seem to weaken from it, the EU at the same time affects the humanitarian situation in 
the country negatively. This effect can be seen both in the Syrian population and the 
operations of humanitarian actors. After eight years of conflict, the government has 
tightened its grip on the country and its economy, despite the sanctions.  
 
6.3 Final conclusions 
 
How can the EU promote its humanitarian and normative objectives of being on the side 
of Syrians, without strengthening the Assad government? If the conflict continues, and 
the political transition is nowhere near in sight, what can the EU do to fulfil at least 
some of its objectives? Will the EU have to loosen its preconditions for reconstruction 
assistance if the political process does not move forward, but the risks for human 
security in Syria, as well as in neighbouring countries and other refugee-hosting 
countries, including Europe, become more prominent? 
The concept of reconstruction itself might come to play at this kind of a scenario. It has 
been argued above that the concept of post-conflict reconstruction is flexible and 
encompasses a large variety of features and principles. Defining boundaries between 
what is reconstruction and what is post-conflict recovery, stabilisation and humanitarian 
assistance is not easy in all contexts, and this is where the EU and other actors might 
have more space for their actions. 
The EU strategy for Syria (European Commission & HR/VP, 3) notes: “Bilateral 
cooperation with the Syrian government was suspended after the regime’s violent 
repression of the civilian uprising in 2011. The EU has, nevertheless, continued to 
support the Syrian people, through humanitarian assistance to save lives, as well as aid 
to provide essential services and support civil society.” This statement makes a clear 




the government, are the receivers of aid and the ones that need it. Thus the EU 
highlights being on the side of the people. The funding has also been said to target 
humanitarian assistance as well as non-humanitarian assistance, such as education, 
support to livelihoods, local governance, health and civil society support. (ibid.) 
However, are these activities and others such as demining, stabilisation, rehabilitation of 
basic infrastructures and service delivery reconstruction? Who decides? 
Brown (2018, 8) makes an interesting observation that the EU support for local 
governance and civilian stabilisation for opposition areas during the conflict has been, 
in fact, anticipatory reconstruction already. These efforts form a counter-statebuilding 
effort, which works against the official government through strengthening opposition’s 
political institutions. Thus instead of a liberal statebuilding, the EU and other western 
actors have actually operated in building counter-state institutions. (ibid.) 
Also, the discussion about the concepts themselves has already started. In the EU-
hosted high-level meeting on the Syria crisis, which was organised on the sidelines of 
the UN General Assembly in 2018 (UN WebTV 2018), many participants of the 
discussion, including the EU and member states, highlighted the difference between 
stabilisation and reconstruction. Reconstruction is something actors cannot do, but they 
can do stabilisation. This could indicate that the realisation that despite the political 
process not moving forward, there Syrian people, including IDPs, have humanitarian 
and development needs, that need to be met.  
Haid (2019, 19) argues that the political stance against reconstruction has not prevented 
reconstruction. International humanitarian organisations have started rebuilding 
infrastructure under the terms of early recovery, stabilisation and community resistance 
aid. Also, the UN has budgeted $173,6 million to early recovery and livelihoods efforts 
in 2018 humanitarian response plan. For Haid, this undermines the official policies. 
(ibid.) Thus operating under different terms than reconstruction could, on one hand, 
offer the EU a way to address the needs of the most vulnerable and work towards its 
humanitarian objectives, but on the other hand, this can undermine the official policy 
and diminish its credibility. Why would the Assad government agree to the political 
transition, if it can rely on international community to recover the areas that it is not 
interested in reconstructing by itself? This represents the major dilemma for the 




Analysing these dynamics would require a more in-depth analysis of the EU policy 
from several perspectives, which is not in the scope of this thesis. However, through the 
analysis of the EU’s approach, it was possible to point out several issues in the approach 
that contribute to this problem. The current research is mainly based on secondary 
sources. Adding interviews of key stakeholders inside the EU and its partners could 
provide a more in-depth view on how the policy has been formulated, and whether there 
has been contradictions and varying perceptions on it.  
Additional research could be done on the approaches of the EU member states to the 
reconstruction of Syria and the policy coherence within the EU. Even though the official 
line of the EU has been unified, what policies do single member countries have on Syria 
and its reconstruction? For example, France and Germany have had sometimes differing 
policies compared to the EU line (see Koenig 2017). Also, the effect of the European 
domestic politics, such as the discussions on the situation of refugees in Europe and the 
question of violent extremism, both jihadist and extreme right groups, could be taken 
into account to evaluate the approaches and policies. One could also explore the 
boundaries of the reconstruction as a concept: what activities are included in 
reconstruction in theory, in words, and action? How are different instruments used in 
different fields such as stabilisation, early recovery, as well as humanitarian and non-
humanitarian aid? This research could analyse the EU instruments used and take into 
account the member state policies as well. Another way to continue the analysis could 
be a comparative analysis of reconstruction approaches of opposing powers on the 
conflict sides, for example, between the EU and Russia. This has been started on some 
levels by, for example, Bartenev (2018), who studied the Russian and Western 
approaches. 
Finally, even though the EU emphasises the role of Syrians in solving the conflict, and 
that the EU is only supporting and not trying to make the decisions for them, is the 
reality like this? Have the Syrians been involved in, for example, the preparations for 
the post-agreement reconstruction? Have the Syrians been involved in planning and 
implementing the EU support in Syria and for the Geneva negotiations? Has their 
participation been meaningful or tokenistic? This would be an interesting topic for 
further research: to study what the meaningful participation of Syrians means in the 
policy context of the international actors. Does the presence of multiple negotiation 




locked, is the proliferation of tracks a positive or negative development? In Syria’s case, 
these tracks were not able to produce significant progress in producing a political 
solution to the conflict. 
These possible strands of research represent only a fraction of what kind of research 
could be done in the case of reconstruction of Syria. It has become clear that the topic is 
becoming more and more acute and the dilemmas related to it more known among 
international actors. On the other hand, the current situation of protracted conflict in 
Syria has led to fundamental policy questions such as: is alleviating human suffering 
more important than defending political and normative principles that would be violated 
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